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Articles
Mistake, Frustration, and the Windfall
Principle of Contract Remedies
by
ANDREW KULL*
I. Introduction
The problems we call "mistake" and "frustration" are described in
contract doctrine as if they were exceptional conditions, when in fact
they are endemic to the bargain transaction.1 They are ordinarily treated
as separate topics, when in fact they represent aspects of the same phe-
nomenon. And while mistake and frustration are traditionally thought
to constitute grounds for relief from contractual obligation, a more accu-
rate generalization is that a court finding mistake or frustration will deny
relief, whether it is being asked to force a transaction ahead or to undo
one that has been wholly or partially performed.
A substantial body of case law supports an important but unac-
knowledged rule of contract doctrine: that the proper legal response to
certain problems resulting from contracts that are "incomplete" or "not
fully specified" is to leave the parties alone. Such a rule stands in sharp
contrast to the.usual prescription of modem commentary, which recom-
* Associate Professor of Law, Emory University. A.B. 1969, University of California,
Berkeley; B.A. 1973, Oxford University; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago. For valuable criti-
cism of earlier drafts, the author is grateful to Howard Abrams, Jennifer Arlen, Robert L.
Birmingham, Richard Craswell, Richard Epstein, Paul Heald, Howard 0. Hunter, Harriet
King, James Lindgren, R.A. MacCrindle, Fred McChesney, and Robert Rasmussen; as well as
to participants in a faculty seminar at the University of Connecticut Law School.
1. "Mistake" of the kind to be discussed is the so-called mutual mistake "of value, or as
to factors that affect value," 3 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 605 (1960),
epitomized by the supposed mistake of Sherwood and Walker regarding the fertility of a cow.
See Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887). The term "frustration" is em-
ployed here in its English usage, by which the one word conveniently encompasses the prom-
isor's claim that his performance has been rendered "impossible" or "impracticable," as well
as the converse claim (the American "frustration") that his performance should be excused
because the bargained-for counterperformance has lost its value to him.
mends that "gaps" in contracts be "filled" by judicial intervention to
serve a variety of social ends. The question thus arises whether the tradi-
tional rule may not serve the same or equally valuable ends with equal or
greater efficiency.
This Article proposes (1) a unified conceptual model for describing
the problem of mistake and frustration; (2) a hypothesis about the case
law; (3) a review of the case law to defend the hypothesis; and (4) an
argument against the prevailing academic conception that sees a mis-
taken or frustrated contract as an occasion for judicial intervention in the
form of "gap-filling."
(1) The Model
Mistake and frustration are the rule, not the exception, and they are
two names for the same problem. We may hypothesize perfect knowl-
edge about the present moment but not about the future. Every contract
is influenced by a "mutual mistake" as to the proposed exchange of val-
ues, if only because present values inescapably reflect projected but un-
knowable future values. Every agreement is to some extent "frustrated"
in that the precise cost and value of either side's performance can never
be known in advance. We form contracts in the knowledge that our in-
formation is imperfect, and we do not expect to anticipate with exactness
the precise cost or value, at the time of performance, of what we are
either to give or to receive. At a profounder level than that addressed by
the American Law Institute, every party to a contract "is aware, at the
time the contract is made, that he has only limited knowledge with re-
spect to the facts to which the [transaction] relates"; being human, he
necessarily "treats his limited knowledge as sufficient."'2
The observation that there is a close relation between the rules af-
fording relief from contractual liability by reason of mutual mistake on
the one hand and frustration on the other is now a commonplace.3 Both
doctrines are fundamentally concerned with the contractual allocation of
risk.4 The risk in either case involves the potential disparity between the
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154(b) (1979).
3. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 436 (1979)
(referring to the doctrine of mistake and "its sister-doctrine, frustration"); Richard A. Posner
& Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related Doctrines in Contract Law: An Economic
Analysis, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 118 n. 112 (1977) (observing that "[t]he mutual-mistake cases
are particularly difficult to distinguish analytically from the impossibility cases").
4. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE 59-60 (1981); MICHAEL J. TRE-
BILCOCK, THE LiMrrs OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT ch. 5 ("Symmetric Information Imperfec-
tions") (forthcoming); Edwin W. Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through
Legal Devices, 24 COLUM. L. REv. 335, 342-45, 355-57 (1924). These authors recognize that
both mistake and frustration are problems of risk allocation. It is a standard premise of mod-
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terms of the exchange as envisioned at the time of contract formation and
the terms of the same exchange as subsequently perceived in light of
greater information. While this much is common ground, or nearly so,
the fact that "mistake" and "frustration" have become logically and
functionally indistinguishable has not generally been appreciated.
Whether from lack of curiosity or merely from habit, judges and writers
continue to defer to a supposed distinction between the doctrines-the
idea that mistake relates to a misapprehension about existing circum-
stances, while frustration arises from a failure to anticipate supervening
events.5 But in the present state of the law, with excuse available on the
same terms in either circumstance, 6 this is a distinction without a
difference. 7
ern commentary that frustration, at least, is a risk allocation problem. See, e.g., JOHN E.
MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS ch. 8 (3d ed. 1990); Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at
87-88.
5. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 151 cmt. a (1979) (to constitute
"mistake," an erroneous belief "must relate to the facts as they exist at the time of the making
of the contract," and "[a] party's prediction or judgment as to events to occur in the future,
even if erroneous, is not a 'mistake' as that word is defined here").
6. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 cmt. b (1979) (relief for
mutual mistake as to "basic assumption") with id. § 261 cmt. b (relief for supervening imprac-
ticability belying a "basic assumption" on which both parties made the contract).
7. The traditional mistake-frustration distinction survives from an era in which the clas-
sification had legal consequences. In a legal system where a mistake as to value or "quality"
would never void a contract, and where the only unforeseen contingency that would excuse
performance was logical or physical impossibility, the distinction between a mistake as to ex-
isting facts and a faulty prediction was a natural one to draw. A mistake as to existing facts
might merit judicial scrutiny because of its potential to inhibit contract formation or enforce-
ability. Thus a mutual mistake, in the traditional definition, might prevent formation of a
contract by obstructing a meeting of the minds. E.g., Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep.
375, 376 (Ex. 1864). Alternatively, it might result in an agreement unenforceable by reason of
some intrinsic impossibility or some fatal equivocation in its terms. See, eg., Allen v. Ham-
mond, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 63, 64-65 (1837) (contract of employment to perform work already
done); Scott v. Coulson, 2 Ch. 249, 253 (C.A. 1903) (contract of insurance on the life of a
person already dead); Couturier v. Hastie, 10 Eng. Rep. 1065, 1069 (1856) (contract for sale of
goods that have already been sold). A mistake as to future contingencies could have no such
consequences. While it might indeed have formed the basis of the bargain, it was not a reason
for which the bargain would ever be set aside: the implicit rule of such famous cases as
Paradine v. Jane, 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647), and Hall v. Wright, 120 Eng. Rep. 695 (Ex.
Ch. 1859), is that parties allocate the risk of all future contingencies when they make their
contract. Accordingly, one way to enforce a rule of nearly strict liability in contract was to
deny that this sort of mistake was in legal signification a "mistake." A party complaining that
circumstances had not turned out the way the bargainers had anticipated was remitted to the
separate doctrine reserved for such cases, the threshold to which was the narrow but intelligi-
ble test of supervening impossibility. See Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309, 313 (Q.B.
1863) (reviewing the circumstances--chiefly the death or incapacity of someone engaged to
perform personal services-in which supervening impossibility was early recognized as a de-
fense to contractual liability).
As the scope of excuse expanded to its present dimensions, becoming available on a show-
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A unified model of the mistake-frustration problem begins with the
recognition that some disparity between anticipation and realization is an
inevitable incident of every contractual exchange, and that the risk of
such disparity is usually allocated by the express or implied terms of the
contract. In the vast majority of cases the disparity simply passes unno-
ticed; unless it surpasses the bargained-for uncertainties of human exist-
ence, it will not give rise to complaint. 8 The risk of loss from the ebb and
flow of costs and values is ordinarily allocated, by a contractual term
"implied in fact," to the party on whom it falls. One who seeks relief
from contractual obligation on the ground of mistake or frustration is
complaining that he suffers the disadvantage of an exceptional disparity,
the risk of which was not allocated by the parties. The rejoinder by the
party opposing discharge or avoidance (whether or not so expressed) is
invariably that the risk of the disparity complained of was allocated by
contract to the party complaining.9 A judgment that a contract is "void
for mistake" or "frustrated" represents a determination that the risk of
the disparity in question was not allocated to either party, expressly or by
implication.
ing of an unallocated disparity in the terms of the exchange, the purported distinction between
existing circumstances and supervening events was rendered both pointless and arbitrary. If
the same relief is available under either heading, it scarcely matters how we classify the parties'
misapprehension. Nor is the purported distinction between present and future a meaningful
one for the reality of bargaining. Our appraisal of the present value of what we are to give or
to receive is in every instance a function of its anticipated future value. Neither cow, nor
diamond, nor Blackaere has market value today except as we and others assess its likely value
tomorrow. It is thus impossible to assess the cost to us or value to others of any future per-
formance we might offer except on the basis of assumptions about future circumstances. In the
formation of these assumptions, moreover, the attempted distinction between existing facts and
future contingencies is without significance. Value is a function of information thought to
affect value, and it is the relative pertinence or remoteness to that function-not its status as
"fact" or "prediction"-that determines the materiality of a given piece of information.
8. The magnitude of the contractual disappointment that will be perceived to have been
implicitly allocated on this basis is a function of "the changing practices of men and ... their
judgment as to what makes most strongly for human prosperity," 6 CORBIN supra note 1,
§ 1361, and of the idiosyncracies of judicial appreciation. A dramatic increase in the cost of
performance is plainly more likely today than it was a hundred years ago to afford possible
grounds for relief; but the intriguing question of why the law should have developed in the
direction of greater leniency-with its correlative, the impossible question of how much dis-
parity is too much-this Article does not attempt to answer.
9. In other words, the response of the opposing party might be either "the risk of this
outcome was allocated to you," or "the disparity you're complaining about is not sufficiently
grave to warrant relief," or "the revealed disparity does not contravene a 'basic assumption' on
which we contracted." But the last two responses are both functionally equivalent to an asser-
tion that the risk of the disparity was implicitly allocated to the party on whom it might fall, in
other words to the party seeking discharge.
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(2) The Hypothesis
It will be easier to state the hypothesis of the argument if we are
clear about what it is not. This Article does not address the legal issue
typically litigated in mistake and frustration cases: how to decide
whether or not the risk of a particular disparity, once its existence has
been revealed, has been allocated by the parties.10 Nor does it address
the question that preoccupies most of the economics-based commentary
on the subject: whether, and for what classes of cases, a rule permitting
discharge for mistake or frustration is efficient as compared with a rule of
strict liability. 1 Rather, this Article inquires what it is that courts actu-
ally do when they conclude (correctly or not) that a particular contract is
either void for mistake or frustrated-when they conclude, in other
words, that the risk of the disparity complained of was not allocated by
the contracting parties.
Our hypothesis is that the characteristic and traditional response of
our legal system to cases of mistaken and frustrated contracts is neither
to relieve the disadvantaged party nor to assign the loss to the superior
risk bearer, but to leave things alone. The party who has balked at per-
forming will not be forced to proceed, but the completed exchange will
not be recalled. Walker will not be forced to deliver to Sherwood a
breeding cow sold for the price of beef, but neither will Wood be allowed
to recover the yellow diamond, already delivered, unwittingly sold to
Boynton for the price of a topaz.12 Where an exchange has been inter-
rupted after part performance--the usual case in the context of frustra-
10. The factual issue of risk allocation is, appropriately, the central concern of contract
litigation in which a party seeks discharge by reason of mistake or frustration, and the search
for methods to guide this inquiry accounts for most of the traditional law on the subject. See,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 154 (1979) ("When a Party Bears the Risk of
a Mistake"); 13 SAMUEL WILLSTON, WILLSTON ON CONTRACTS § 1543A (Walter H.E. Jae-
ger ed., 3d ed. 1970) ("The Risk of Mistake May Be Assumed by Contract"); id. § 1544 ("Mis-
take Must Relate to Fundamental Assumption"). The question has been illuminated by more
recent, economics-oriented investigation as well. See Victor P. Goldberg, Impossibility and
Related Excuses, 144 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 100, 101 (1988) (investigat-
ing "why reasonable businessmen would choose to excuse performance for some changed cir-
cumstances, but not others"); George G. Triantis, Contractual Allocation of Unknown Risks:
The Search for Justifications for the Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability, - U. TORONTO
L.J. - (forthcoming 1992) (arguing that contracting parties can and do allocate risks even of
unforeseen contingencies).
11. See, e.g., Janet K. Smith & Richard L. Smith, Contract Law, Mutual Mistake, and
Incentives to Produce and Disclose Information, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 467, 483-87 (1990); Alan
0. Sykes, The Doctrine of Commercial Impracticability in a Second-Best World, 19 J. LEGAL
STUD. 43, 73-93 (1990); Michelle J. White, Contract Breach and Contract Discharge Due to
Impossibility: A Unified Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 353, 360-74 (1988).
12. See Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 577, 33 N.W. 919, 924 (1887); Wood v.
Boynton, 64 Wis. 265, 271, 25 N.W. 42, 45 (1885).
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tion--courts following the traditional rule will not intervene to readjust
the allocation of losses that chance and the parties' agreement have cre-
ated. Persons hiring rooms from which to view a coronation procession
will be excused by the king's indisposition from paying any balance of the
price not yet due; but they will not be allowed to recover sums already
paid at the time the ceremony is canceled. 13
The principle of inertia that frequently seems to guide the remedies
for mutual mistake and frustration may seem harsh in some particular
applications, but it is neither arbitrary nor illogical. Disparities between
anticipation and realization in contractual exchange, the risk of which
has not been allocated by the parties, are in the nature of "windfalls"
(including those, carrying adverse consequences, that might more prop-
erly be described as "casualties"). The law will not act to enforce such
windfalls-to compel an exchange on terms that were not bargained
for-because its objective is limited to giving effect to the parties' agree-
ment. But if the parties have not allocated the risk of a particular wind-
fall or casualty to one of them, neither have they allocated it to the other.
There is thus no basis in their bargain on which to justify a court's inter-
vention to shift windfall benefits and burdens in either direction. As a
matter of social utility, excluding for the moment considerations of fair-
ness, it will ordinarily be a matter of indifference whether the windfall
cost or benefit, once realized, falls to A or to B. Reallocation after the
event thus involves significant administrative costs while achieving no
compelling social advantage. The judicial disposition to let windfalls
lie-to answer the claim of mistake or frustration by confirming the sta-
tus quo-is here referred to as the "windfall principle."
(3) The Evidence of the Case Law
Part II of this Article surveys cases of mistake and frustration in a
variety of contexts to indicate both the broad applicability of the windfall
principle and the limits of its influence. The exploration of the cases
moves from the simpler issues of rescission for mutual mistake-where
the windfall principle is still a highly accurate predictor of outcomes-to
the more complex problem of assigning losses from frustrated contracts.
The paradigm of the windfall resolution of this problem is presented by
the well-known Coronation Cases; the antecedents, rationale, and subse-
quent rejection of this familiar legal monument are accordingly examined
in some detail. Readers whose primary interest is in the theoretical im-
plications of the windfall principle, rather than its past or present stand-
13. The Coronation Cases are discussed infra at 22-28.
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ing in American and English law, may want to skip to the argument of
Part III as soon as they have seen how the principle operates in its proto-
typical applications.
(4) The Argument
Viewed as a conscious policy preference, rather than as evidence of
laziness or moral weakness, the windfall principle implicates fundamen-
tal issues in the law of contracts. Its source is found in the individualistic
conception of contractual obligation as something exclusively defined by
the voluntary undertakings of the parties. It reflects, as well, the tradi-
tional skepticism of the common law toward the likelihood of increasing
justice by requiring that casualty losses be shared.
These underlying implications of the old windfall cases make them
pertinent to the modem debate over judicial remedies for frustrated con-
tracts. Rigorously applied, the windfall principle requires that losses to
the parties under a frustrated contract be left to lie where they fall. A
rule to this effect, announced and consistently applied in England from
1867 to 1942 and followed occasionally in American jurisdictions, 14 was
widely criticized as harsh and unjust. Its eventual abandonment by the
English courts confirmed the modem preference for a higher degree of
judicial intervention to shift casualty losses. 15
The assumption that judges in these cases can improve on the imper-
fect results of private ordering currently attracts a curious mixture of
support. The ordinary view of judicial reallocation sees the courts as
imposing a distribution of losses that is fairer than the parties to a con-
tract could hope to achieve by ex-ante negotiations. 16 At the same time,
law and economics observers, while skeptical of the notion that one dis-
tribution of losses could be fairer than another, have tended to favor an
interventionist judicial role in contract interpretation as a means of
achieving various efficiencies. The principal economics-based prescrip-
tion for frustrated contracts has been that judges capture for the parties
the gains associated with efficient risk spreading. 17 Under either ap-
proach, the contemporary formulation of the problem sees the frustrated
contract as "incomplete," in that it did not define expressly the obliga-
tions of the parties upon the occurrence of the frustrating event, and thus
assigns to the court the task of supplying a "gap-filling" term.
14. See infra at 28-33.
15. See infra notes 121-130 and accompanying text.
16. This common view finds expression in a number of forms. See, e.g., statements
quoted infra text accompanying notes 130, 141, and 172.
17. Discussed infra at 45-48.
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The case law underlying the windfall principle challenges these justi-
fications for judicial intervention. The cases remind us of the advantages
of "rule-oriented methods" over "cost-benefit or balancing methods" '
for resolving contractual disputes. Rules that induce and facilitate the
private, ex-ante disposition of losses associated with frustrated contracts
may be more efficient than rules that permit or require the same disposi-
tion to be made by ex-post judicial intervention. Moreover, the cases
illuminate the fact that the gaps perceived in frustrated contracts are cre-
ated only by the availability of judicial intervention to fill them. Under a
windfall regime, but not otherwise, contracting parties not only have the
means to allocate all the risks of frustration they think it worthwhile to
identify, but are actually obliged to allocate the incidence of the resulting
loss should the contract be frustrated.
The discussion in Part III criticizes the standard arguments for judi-
cial gap-filling as a remedy for frustrated contracts, suggesting that they
fail to take account of the peculiar nature of the gaps that give rise to
mistake or frustration. It is simply not possible to devise a default rule
that will yield a usable, contractual allocation of risks not identified by
the parties. A rule that invites parties to externalize the costs of risk
allocation by leaving the consequences of unallocated risks to be deter-
mined ex-post by the judicial system is possible and may even be desira-
ble, but it cannot be defended by the usual analogy to "off-the-rack"
contract terms. Furthermore, the standard economic justification for ju-
dicial intervention in the aftermath of frustration-the realization of effi-
ciency gains from allocating risk to the least-cost risk bearer-is
inherently unachievable, because a pre-existing allocation of risks cannot
be affected one way or the other by what is inevitably, ex-post, merely a
redistribution of losses.
Proponents of judicial intervention are accordingly remitted to the
more elusive standard of fairness. To justify the judicial allocation of
frustration losses we must be satisfied not only that the resulting gain in
fairness is worth the expenditure of judicial resources, but that a regime
holding out the possibility of judicially determined fairness is preferable
to one in which contracting parties have both the power and the respon-
sibility to determine the consequences of their own bargains. The choice
here lies between conflicting moral claims that would be incommensura-
ble even if they were quantifiable. The legal tradition constituting the
windfall principle may nevertheless help to illuminate a conflict that it
cannot resolve.
18. See Mario J. Rizzo, Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law, 4 CATo
J. 865, 873 (1985).
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H. The Windfall Principle
Walker agreed to sell Sherwood a purebred cow named "Rose 2d of
Aberlone" for a price approximating her value as beef, both parties be-
lieving (as the court supposed) that the cow was infertile. Prior to deliv-
ery it was determined by the seller's agent that the cow was with calf.
The animal's value, in light of this information, was approximately ten
times the contract price. 19 The court held, in a suit by the buyer for
replevin, that the contract could be avoided by the seller upon proof of
the mutual mistake. Such a mistake, the court explained, "was not of the
mere quality of the animal, but went to the very nature of the thing."20
Wood sold to Boynton the jeweler, for one dollar, a straw-colored
stone about the size of a canary's egg. The seller had been informed, and
both parties believed at the time of the sale, that the stone was probably a
topaz. Some time after delivery and payment the stone was found to be
an uncut diamond worth about $700.21 The court held, in a suit by the
seller for replevin, that the contract could not be avoided by the seller
notwithstanding proof of the mutual mistake. In the absence of fraud on
the one hand or warranty on the other, the court explained, neither seller
nor buyer could rescind a sale because the "character or value" of the
thing sold turned out to be different from what had been supposed.22
A favorite exercise of first-year contracts teachers is to ask students
how the holdings in Sherwood v. Walker and Wood v. Boynton might be
reconciled. There is only one good answer.2 3 It is hinted at in some of
the casebooks,24 but is scarcely acknowledged in the cases, the treatises,
19. Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 569-71, 33 N.W. 919, 919-20 (1887).
20. Id. at 577, 33 N.W. at 923. On the facts of the case it is difficult to believe that the
mistake can have been shared by the buyer. Sherwood was a banker and gentleman farmer; he
appears to have been interested in acquiring polled Angus breeding stock, not beef in wholesale
quantities. But this view of the facts, reflected in the dissenting opinion, see id. at 580, 33 N.W.
at 925, makes Sherwood v. Walker an entirely different case, one involving unilateral rather
than mutual mistake. Every reference to Sherwood v. Walker in this discussion treats it as a
case of mutual mistake, however contrary to fact this assumption may be.
21. Wood v. Boynton, 64 Wis. 265, 268, 25 N.W. 42, 43 (1885).
22. Id at 271, 25 N.W. at 44.
23. It is sometimes suggested that something in the circumstances of the transaction be-
tween Wood and Boynton made it appropriate to find that the seller in that case bore the risk
of the disparity; for example, that Wood elected to sell the stone in "conscious ignorance" of
its precise nature. This would presumably be the explanation of the American Law Institute.
See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 9.3, at 515-21 (2d ed. 1990); cf RESTATEMENT
OF RESTrrUTION § 12 cmt. c, illus. 9 (1936).
The test of this answer makes another classroom exercise. Supposing that Wood had sold
the stone for delivery "next week" and then discovered its true value a day later, would the
same court compel the exchange of a $700 diamond for a dollar?
24. See FRIEDRICH KESSLER ET AL., CONTRACTS 873, 897 (3d ed. 1986).
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or the restatements. 25 The good answer is that in each case, when it
appeared that the contract of sale was premised on a mutual mistake as
to the value of the goods, the disputed property was left where it was.
When the mistake was discovered before delivery, the cow stayed with
the seller; but when new information as to value became known some
time after performance had been completed, the diamond stayed with the
buyer. A court, these cases suggest, will not require performance of a
contract that is shown to rest on a significant mutual mistake as to value;
but neither will it grant rescission if the same contract has already been
performed.
The two decisions, in isolation, make no more than a curious con-
trast. But cases in which one party to a contract seeks relief by reason of
mistake or frustration are frequently resolved by what is in effect a deci-
sion to leave things alone. The operation of this "windfall principle"
may be observed in a variety of related modes.
First, cases in which a party seeks rescission of a contract on the
grounds of mutual mistake, as in the cow and diamond cases, are most
often decided in whatever manner leaves the parties free of further obli-
gations to each other, whether by way of performance or restitution. Be-
cause a principle of inertia is not an acknowledged part of our law of
contracts, these outcomes are necessarily announced by finding "mis-
take" or "no mistake," as the case may be, or by finding that the risk of
the loss complained of had been assumed by the plaintiff.26 The windfall
principle predicts the outcome of such cases by inquiring whether the
obligations of the parties remain executory at the time of suit: the execu-
25. English judges occasionally acknowledge that the availability of relief for mistake or
frustration depends on whether, or how recently, the contract has been performed. See, eg.,
cases cited infra note 50. Considering the circumstances under which a contract for the sale of
land might be avoided for mutual mistake, Professor Palmer concedes that "[o]ther factors
must be taken into account, for example, whether a deed has been delivered or the contract is
still executory." 2 GEORGE E. PALMER, LAW OF RESTITUTON § 12.2, at 538 (1978) (citing
Enequist v. Bemis, 115 Vt. 209, 55 A.2d 617 (1947)). The most forthright among the treatise-
writers is Professor Hunter, who observes of Wood and Sherwood that "[p]erhaps one of the
most telling differences in the two cases is timing." HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF
CONTRACTS: BREACH AND REMEDIES 12.02[3][c] (1986). By contrast, the discussion of
relief for mutual mistake in the second Restatement of Contracts contains no suggestion that
"timing" could have anything to do with it.
26. Although the inquiry into risk allocation is here argued to be the only analytically
coherent way to resolve these disputes, a given holding that "plaintiff assumed the risk" may
still be giving effect to what is fundamentally a windfall disposition. The distinction is obvi-
ously an elusive one. The characterization of any such decision as a windfall case depends on
one's appreciation of the circumstances and of the likelihood that the same plaintiff would
have been found to have assumed the same risk had the same transaction been challenged
when executory rather than executed (or vice-versa).
[Vol. 43HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
tory contract is much more likely to be rescinded. 27 In the relatively rare
cases where mistake is asserted after part performance, the windfall out-
come is less clearly predictable; although there are mistake cases in
which the parties have been permitted to walk away from a partially
completed transaction with no obligation of restitution.28
Similarly, the windfall principle predicts what might seem obvious:
that a claim of frustration is far more likely to succeed if interposed
before performance has been completed rather than after. In the typical
case where frustration is asserted after part performance, the windfall
principle predicts and justifies the standard rule by which executory obli-
gations are discharged without calling into question the validity of obli-
gations already performed.29
Finally, because it typically denies all relief in cases of interrupted
performance, the windfall principle embodies the teaching (familiar from
Paradine v. Jane30) that casualty losses falling in the vicinity of a con-
tractual relationship should be left as chance and the parties' agreement
may have distributed them, not reallocated by law in the interest of the
"fairness" associated with loss sharing. The line of decisions (chiefly
English) that culminated in the well-known Coronation Cases applied
this doctrine to frustrated contracts by denying recovery for the cost or
value of a party's performance prior to discharge. 31 Severely criticized
and eventually repudiated, this traditional application of the windfall
principle nevertheless elucidates both the problem of contractual risk al-
location and the available means for assigning losses that the parties have
not expressly allocated themselves. The rejection of the windfall rule in
this narrow but highly significant context leads directly to the modem
debate over judicial intervention to supplement contracts deemed
"incomplete."
An account of the role of the windfall principle in the decisions must
be suggestive rather than rigorous. Even the paradigm instance of its
operation-the contrasting results in Wood and Sherwood-proves noth-
ing unless we assume that the mistakes in the two cases were comparable
and, further, that both cases were correctly decided. Strictly comparable
cases can be constructed only by hypothesis. 32 This Article neither pro-
27. See infra Part II.A.
28. See infra Part II.C.
29. See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
30. 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647). See infra text accompanying notes 91-94.
31. See infra at 28-33.
32. Had Rose 2d of Aberlone surprised her new owner by producing a calf the following
spring, the same mutual mistake would surely not have been found to justify rescission; nor is
it at all likely that Wood would have been obliged to part with the diamond had it been learned
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poses that the windfall principle is an invariable rule of decision, nor that
the principle operates in isolation from other considerations. 33 Its more
modest contention is that the windfall principle affords an instructive and
relatively reliable explanation of outcomes in a variety of situations in-
volving mistake and frustration. The windfall decisions may be profita-
bly analyzed, not as the product of outmoded judicial reticence, but as
evidence of a conscious preference for resolving the problems arising
from supposedly incomplete contractual arrangements by reliance on pri-
vate ordering rather than judicial intervention.
The following discussion offers an illustrative sampling of the effects
of the windfall principle, proceeding from the simpler problems of rescis-
sion to the more complex issues of shifting losses from frustrated con-
tracts. For convenience of reference and to accommodate the language
of the decisions, the cases are organized according to the traditional,
though functionally indistinguishable, categories of "misiake" and "frus-
tration." A further division, more pertinent to the thesis of the present
investigation, separates those cases in which a party seeks rescission or
discharge either before or after performance from those in which the de-
fense to liability is asserted in the course of performance.
A. Mistake, Asserted Before or After Performance
The cases granting or denying rescission for mutual mistake, exem-
plified by Sherwood v. Walker and Wood v. Boynton, leave a pronounced
impression that the courts are manipulating doctrine in adherence to an
unacknowledged rule of decision. Whereas the mistake about the cow
"went to the very nature of the thing" (rescission), the very similar mis-
take about the stone involved merely its "character or value" (no rescis-
sion). It is true that the purported distinction now tends to be described
differently. Judges formerly distinguished between mistakes that related
to the "identity" of a thing as opposed to its "attributes"; encouraged by
the Restatement, they now inquire whether the mistake is one that affects
"a basic assumption on which the contract was made."'34 The modem
prior to delivery what kind of stone it was. These conclusions seem reasonably safe, despite
the absence of any such qualification to the avowed reasoning of the two decisions.
33. An alternative explanation of every decision finding or denying the existence of mis-
take or frustration is that the outcome respects an implicit contractual allocation of risks dis-
cerned by the court-whether correctly or incorrectly, and whether or not this ground of
decision is acknowledged in the opinion.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (1979).
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version is less quaint but no less conclusory. 35 The evident advantage of
either formula is that it permits a given case to be decided either way.
The traditional approach to the problem derives from a nineteenth-
century securities case, Kennedy v. Panama Mail Co., 36 where a prospec-
tus offering shares in a shipping company contained an innocent but ma-
terial misstatement about the company's business prospects. A
subscriber for shares (on a partly paid basis) sought rescission of his con-
tract and the return of moneys paid; the company counterclaimed for the
next installment of the subscription price. The Court of Queen's Bench
held that the availability of rescission depended on whether the difference
between the shares as they were in light of the true facts, and the shares
as they would have been had the facts been as described, was "a differ-
ence in substance in the nature of the thing."37 The rule stated by Justice
Blackburn, citing Roman law authority, was that "if there be misappre-
hension as to the substance of the thing there is no contract; but if it be
only a difference in some quality or accident, even though the misappre-
hension may have been the actuating motive to the purchaser, yet the
contract remains binding." 38
This nineteenth-century judicial Platonism has proved surprisingly
resilient as an explanation of results that are notably inconsistent.
Neither the traditional inquiry into "quality" versus "identity," nor the
Restatement's test of "basic assumption," permits any suggestion that the
time at which a mistake is discovered should be relevant to the availabil-
ity of rescission. Yet an otherwise erratic pattern of decisions, finding
"mistake" or "no mistake" on seemingly similar facts, is greatly clarified
if we look in each case to see how far the contract had been performed at
35. To illustrate the meaning of such a "basic assumption," the American Law Institute
suggests the following:
A contracts to assign to B for $100 a $10,000 debt owed to A by C, who is
insolvent. Both A and B believe that the debt is unsecured and is therefore, virtually
worthless, but in fact it is secured by stock worth approximately $5,000. The con-
tract is voidable by A.
It cmt. b, illus. 5. (A Reporter's note suggests "cf Sherwood v. Walker.") A may rescind, in
other words, because the value of the debt is a "basic assumption" on which the parties con-
tracted-like the fertility of Rose 2d of Aberlone. But cf (as the Reporter, to his credit, also
suggests) Hecht v. Batcheller, 147 Mass. 335, 17 N.E. 651 (1888), where the court refused to
rescind the fully executed sale of a promissory note, the maker of which (unknown to buyer
and seller) previously had become insolvent, explaining that the mutual mistake of the parties
"affects the value of the note, and not its identity." Id. at 339, 17 N.E. at 653.
36. Kennedy v. Panama, N.Z., & Austl. Mail Co., 2 L.R.-Q.B. 580 (1867).
37. Id. at 586.
38. Id. at 588. Rescission was denied on the ground that the shares-which were evi-
dently trading at £5, compared to an aggregate issue price of £7-were "in substance those
[plaintiff] applied for." Id. at 589.
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the time of suit. A bull, believed to be capable of breeding but unable to
serve in that capacity, was determined to be "a bull in name only" (buyer
rejects animal, seller brings action for the price).39 Yet a mistake about
the identity of a thoroughbred horse, sold at auction in the belief that he
was a different animal, was found not to be such "as to make the subject-
matter of the actual contract essentially different from what the parties
believed it to be" (buyer seeks rescission after delivery and payment).4°
The parties' ignorance of defalcations reducing the assets of a bank was a
mutual mistake without which their contract for the sale of its shares
"would never have been entered into" (buyer seeks rescission prior to
closing).41 But a mistaken belief that shares of stock in a bank were
worth at least $136 each, when defalcations unknown to buyer or seller
had reduced their true value to $60, was not a mistake "as to identity or
existence" but one "relating merely to the attributes, quality or value of
the subject" (buyer seeks rescission following delivery and payment).42
The parties' mistaken belief that a parcel of land would not permit on-
site sewage disposal, a fact significantly reducing its value, did not "mate-
rially affect the agreed performances of the parties" (seller seeks reforma-
tion or rescission three years after sale).43 On the other hand, the parties'
ignorance of a possible zoning change interfering with the buyer's in-
tended use of the property was ground for rescission because it consti-
tuted "a basic assumption on which the contract was made" (buyer seeks
rescission prior to closing).44
This tendency to leave the parties in statu quo is particularly notice-
able in the English mistake cases, epitomized by the well-known decision
of the House of Lords in Bell v. Lever Bros.45 Lever Brothers had paid
substantial sums to settle the remaining term of its employment contracts
with two employees whose services it no longer required. Four months
after the payments were made, the company discovered that its former
employees had engaged in misconduct that, had it come to light prior to
the settlement, would have justified their dismissal for cause. Lever
Brothers sued for rescission of the settlement agreements and return of
39. Cotter v. Luckie, 1918 N.Z.L.R. 811, 816-17 (Sup. Ct.) (distinguishing the case of a
horse sold with or without warranty, inasmuch as "[a] horse is a horse even if unsound").
40. Diamond v. British Columbia Thoroughbred Breeders' Soc'y, 52 D.L.R.2d 146, 163-
64 (B.C. Sup. Ct. 1965).
41. Lindeberg v. Murray, 117 Wash. 483, 495, 201 P. 759, 763 (1921).
42. Costello v. Sykes, 143 Minn. 109, 111, 172 N.W. 907, 908 (1919).
43. Dingeman v. Reffitt, 152 Mich. App. 350, 356, 393 N.W.2d 632, 635 (1986).
44. Dover Pool & Racquet Club v. Brooking, 366 Mass. 629, 633, 322 N.E.2d 168, 170
(1975).
45. 1932 App. Cas. 161 (1931).
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the amounts paid, claiming that the agreements had been fraudulently
induced or, in the alternative, that they had been entered into under a
mistake of fact. A jury found that the employees had committed no
fraud, and that at the time of negotiating the agreements they had not
been aware of their liability to dismissal for cause.46 The case was
treated in the House of Lords as one involving a mutual mistake as to a
fundamental assumption: namely, that Lever Brothers would not have
been entitled to terminate the contracts except pursuant to a settlement
agreement. 47
Applied to these intriguing facts, the familiar distinction between
identity and attributes relied upon by Lord Atkin seems more than usu-
ally unhelpful:
I feel the weight of the plaintiffs' contention that a contract immedi-
ately determinable is a different thing from a contract for an unexpired
term .... But, on the whole, I have come to the conclusion that it
would be wrong to decide that an agreement to terminate a definite
specified contract is void if it turns out that the agreement had already
been broken and could have been terminated otherwise. The contract
released is the identical contract in both cases, and the party paying for
release gets exactly what he bargains for.48
The real explanation of the decision in Bell v. Lever Bros. is surely the
windfall principle. This seems reasonably clear if we compare the case to
a hypothetical variant in which Lever Brothers agrees in March to make
settlement payments in June, but discovers its employees' misdeeds in
April. It seems safe to predict that the employees, promptly dismissed
for cause, would not thereafter prevail in a suit to recover payments due
under the agreement.49
46. i at 162-64.
47. IL at 191, 205, 216-17.
48. Id. at 223-24.
49. The disposition of English mistake cases along inertial or windfall lines was greatly
facilitated by Lord Justice Denning in Solle v. Butcher, [19501 1 K.B. 671 (C.A. 1949). Dissat-
isfied with the narrow, allegedly "legal" rule of Bell v. Lever Brothers, Lord Justice Denning
revived an antecedent line of authority which, he asserted, afforded a more liberal, "equitable"
rule to govern cases of mutual mistake. According to the equitable rule, a contract not void
for mistake at law might nevertheless be set aside in equity "if the parties were under a com-
mon misapprehension either as to facts or as to their relative and respective rights, provided
that the misapprehension was fundamental and that the party seeking to set it aside was not
himself at fault." Id at 693. The new rule was readily received-being easier to satisfy than
Lord Atkin's, and allowing considerably more discretion to judges-and it has served as the
basis of subsequent English decisions allowing rescission for mistake. See, eg., Grist v. Bailey,
1967 Ch. 532 (1966) (rescission, prior to conveyance, of contract for the sale of a house, the
price having been fixed in mistaken belief that property was subject to an existing tenancy;
decision based on liberal "equitable," as opposed to strict "legal," rule of mistake).
The invocation of equitable principles and the implicit appeal to judicial discretion have
tended in the English cases to legitimize the grant or denial of rescission based on precisely
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Subsequent English mistake cases are consistently decided in ac-
cordance with the windfall principle, although the critical relationship of
the time at which a mistake is discovered to the availability of the defense
is not always acknowledged.50 The mistake at issue in Magee v. Pennine
Insurance Co.51 presents an unusually close counterpart to Bell v. Lever
Bros., with the exception of the stage in the transaction at which it was
discovered. An insurance company entered into an agreement for the
settlement of a policyholder's laim, both parties being unaware that the
company had a defense to liability on the policy.5 2 Discovering the rele-
vant facts before payment was made, the company sought to avoid the
settlement agreement for mutual mistake. The close analogy to the facts
of Bell v. Lever Bros. suggests that the company's promise to make pay-
ment in settlement should be binding, and the trial judge so held.5 3 Nev-
ertheless, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, holding that it was
proper to set aside the settlement agreement under the more liberal "eq-
uitable" rule.5 4 Neither member of the majority explained how the mis-
take in Magee could be distinguished from the mistake in Bell v. Lever
such factors as whether or how long ago the contract has been performed on either side. The
same development may be observed in the more recent American decisions. See, e.g., Lenawee
County Bd. of Health v. Messerly, 417 Mich. 17, 331 N.W.2d 203 (1982). Criticizing its
venerable holding in Sherwood v. Walker, the Michigan court rejected a suit for rescission of a
completed conveyance of land, notwithstanding the parties' mutual mistake as to what it found
to be "fundamental ... assumptions" having a "material" effect on the agreed exchange of
performances, principally on the ground that rescission, as "an equitable remedy which is
granted only in the sound discretion of the court," was not "reasonable and just under all the
surrounding circumstances" of the case. Id. at 30-32, 331 N.W.2d at 210.
50. In Leaf v. International Galleries, [1950] 2 K.B. 86 (C.A.), the court denied rescission
to a plaintiff who discovered, five years after purchasing it, that a view of Salisbury Cathedral
described as a Constable was not in fact the work of that artist. Yet "[c]learly if, before he had
taken delivery of the picture, [plaintifi] had obtained other advice and come to the conclusion
that the picture was not a Constable, it would have been open to him to rescind." Id. at 92
(Jenkins, L.J., concurring). Unwilling to leave the result on that common sense basis, the
Master of the Rolls (Lord Evershed) explained that "it remains true to say that the plaintiff
still has the article which he contracted to buy. The difference is no doubt considerable, but it
is, as Denning L.J. has observed, a difference in quality and value rather than in the substance
of the thing itself." Id. at 94. Compare Lord Justice Denning's more candid statement in
Oscar Chess Ltd. v. Williams, [1957] 1 W.L.R. 370 (C.A. 1956): "If the buyer had come
promptly, he might have succeeded in getting the whole transaction set aside in equity on the
ground of this mistake: see Solle v. Butcher, but he did not do so and it is now too late for him
to do it: see Leafy. International Galleriem" Id. at 373-74 (footnotes omitted).
51. [1969] 2 Q.B. 507 (C.A.).
52. It was conceded on appeal that innocent, material misstatements made by the insured
in his original application for insurance entitled the company to deny coverage. Premiums had
been paid regularly under a succession of renewal policies. The trial court found no evidence
of fraud or conscious misrepresentation. Id. at 512-14.
53. Id. at 514.
54. Id. at 514-15; see supra note 49.
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Bros.; nor did they acknowledge that the clearest difference between the
cases was simply whether or not the disputed payment had already been
made.55
B. Frustration, Asserted Before or After Performance
The most basic example of frustration prior to performance, so
firmly rooted in the law of sales that its windfall character is hardly rec-
ognized, is the rule that the destruction of specific goods prior to delivery
discharges the obligations of both buyer and seller.56 By extension, the
rule holds generally that the destruction (without fault) prior to perform-
ance of anything essential to performance discharges both parties. This
is the sort of "impossibility" associated with Taylor v. Caldwell,57 where
the owner of a music hall was held not liable to the impresario to whom
he had rented it when, just prior to the engagement, the building was
destroyed by fire. 58 It follows that a contract for the sale of a crop to be
grown on a particular tract of land is discharged when the crop fails;59
that a contract to repair a building is discharged when the building is
destroyed;6° and that a contract to drive logs downstream at a certain
time of year is discharged when the stream dries up as a result of a
drought.61
The traditional explanation of these results, promulgated by Justice
Blackburn in Taylor v. Caldwell, is that the parties' obligations in each
55. Admittedly, some mutual mistake cases are not decided along windfall lines. In Far-
hat v. Rassey, 295 Mich. 349, 294 N.W. 707 (1940), plaintiff accepted $1,400 in settlement of
his claims against defendants, both parties being unaware that, a few hours earlier, the judge to
whom their suit was being tried had filed a written opinion in which he found plaintiff entitled
to $3,933. The settlement agreement was reduced to writing and signed, and a check delivered
to plaintiff's attorney, before this fact was known. Id. at 350, 294 N.W. at 707. Rescission of
the settlement agreement was granted on the basis of mutual mistake. Id at 352, 294 N.W. at
708. The decision in Farhat may reflect a prejudice in favor of professional over private dis-
pute resolution, at least where the expenditure of judicial resources has already been made.
Compare Holmes's suggestion that a wager on a past horse race should be binding on the
parties. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 304 (1881).
56. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-613 (1988).
57. 122 Eng. Rep. 309 (K.B. 1863) (Blackburn, J.).
58. Id. at 312, 315. In Taylor v. Caldwell, plaintiffs were denied recovery for reliance
losses (preperformance expenditures); defendant was left with the loss of his building; both
parties lost the benefit of their bargain. The result is fully consistent with the rule, developed
in subsequent English cases, that losses under a frustrated contract remain where they fall. See
infra notes 79-85, 98-112 and accompanying text.
59. Matousek v. Galligan, 104 Neb. 731, 733, 178 N.W. 510, 510-511 (1920); cf Snipes
Mountain Co. v. Benz Bros. & Co., 162 Wash. 334, 337, 298 P. 714, 715-16 (1931) (allowing
reformation-in effect, a partial rescission-where crop is short).
60. Matthews Constr. Co. v. Brady, 104 N.J.L. 438, 442, 140 A. 433, 433-35 (1928).
61. Clarksville Land Co. v. Harriman, 68 N.H. 374, 375, 44 A. 527, 527-28 (1895).
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such case are impliedly conditioned on the continued existence of the
necessary subject matter. It is, of course, an explanation that effectively
removes such cases from the category of frustration. Since the obliga-
tions imposed by the bargain are contingent, in this view, upon a condi-
tion that has failed, there remains nothing to discharge. The long-
standing criticism of Blackburn's explanation is that it makes outcomes
depend on "implied terms" to which the parties manifestly never turned
their minds.62
If the cases involving destroyed subject matter are viewed as cases of
frustration and not of implied conditions, the windfall nature of the rule
that destruction equals discharge becomes evident. The result of the rule
is that the seller loses his goods; each party loses the benefit of his bar-
gain; and each party bears his own reliance losses. There is no guarantee
that such an outcome will be "fair." Even without comparing the par-
ties' disappointed expectations or consequential damages, it should be
evident that one or the other may have made substantial expenditures in
preparation for the anticipated exchange; so that the frustration of the
contract, for which neither is responsible, may have far graver conse-
quences for one party than for the other. The unequal incidence of simi-
lar hardships in other contexts of contractual frustration has been
thought to invite judicial intervention to impose a sharing of losses.6 3
Claims of frustration asserted after performance has been completed
are understandably rare, since the party complaining of a disparity will
normally balk at beginning performance (in which event the argument is
likely to be phrased in terms of mistake) or else stop in the middle. It can
be predicted, on the basis of the windfall principle, that even a plausible
claim of frustration asserted with respect to a contract that has been fully
performed is almost certain to fail.64
62. The second Restatement "rejects" the analysis of frustration according to which
"there is an 'implied term' of the contract that such extraordinary circumstances will not
occur," preferring the approach of U.C.C. § 2-615 "under which the central inquiry is whether
the non-occurrence of the circumstance was a 'basic assumption on which the contract was
made.'" The Reporter concedes, however, that "[i]n order for the parties to have had such a
'basic assumption' it is not necessary for them to have been conscious of alternatives." 2 RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 310-11 (1979) (introductory note to ch. 11). It is not
clear that an analysis in terms of unconscious "basic assumptions" represents much of an
advance over "implied terms" of which the parties were equally unaware.
63. See the discussion of the Fibrosa case, infra notes 121-126 and accompanying text.
64. The extraordinary decision in National Presto Indus. v. United States, 338 F.2d 99
(Ct. Cl. 1964) (remanding case for reformation), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 962 (1965), serves as the
exception that proves the rule. While the analysis in National Presto is phrased in terms of
"mutual mistake" (a supposed mistake about the feasibility of a manufacturing process), the
circumstances of the case (supplier's disappointment at increased costs) more readily suggest
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The proposition is amply borne out by a number of well-known
cases that arose in consequence of the closing of the Suez Canal, first in
1956 and again in 1967. In one case presenting typical facts, a vessel was
chartered on March 23, 1967 for a voyage from Beaumont/Smiths Bluff,
Texas to Bombay. 65 The customary route for that voyage was through
the Suez Canal, and the freight rate was calculated accordingly. The
vessel sailed on May 15. On June 5, when the Suez Canal was closed to
navigation as a result of the Arab-Israeli war, the ship had crossed the
Atlantic and the Mediterranean to a point only eighty-four miles from
the northern entrance to the Canal.66 Under the circumstances, the ship
had no practical alternative but to change course:
The vessel proceeded westward, back through the Straits of Gibraltar
and around the Cape and eventually arrived in Bombay on July 15th
(some 30 days later than initially expected), traveling a total of 18,055
miles instead of the 9,709 miles which it would have sailed had the
Canal been open. The owner billed $131,978.44 as extra compensa-
tion, which the charterer ... refused to pay.6 7
The theory underlying the owner's claims was a recovery in quantum
meruit, on the premise that the original charter party had been frustrated
and thereby discharged. 68
In cases such as this, where voyages were already under way at the
time the Canal was closed, English and American courts were unani-
mous in rejecting the claim of frustration, no matter how burdensome the
shipowner's additional cost of performance. 69 In a footnote to one of the
decisions, Judge Friendly stated that "no vessels which left port before
the 1967 crisis were permitted to recover any surcharge for making the
longer trip around the Cape of Good Hope.' '70 No contrary result is
discoverable for the 1956 crisis. 71
the typical claim of commercial impracticability. That being so, the Court of Claims' holding
amounts to discharge for frustration after plaintiff has completed performance.
65. American Trading & Prod. Corp. v. Shell Int'l Marine, 453 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1972).
66. Id. at 940.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 941.
69. The American cases, in addition to American Trading, are Transatlantic Fin. Corp. v.
United States, 363 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1966), and Hellenic Lines v. United States, 512 F.2d
1196 (2d Cir. 1975). The rule was established in England by Ocean Tramp Tankers Corp. v.
V/O Sovfracht (The Eugenia), [1964] 2 Q.B. 226 (C.A. 1963), and confirmed (on facts more
closely analogous to those of the American cases) in Palmco Shipping, Inc. v. Continental Ore
Corp. (The "Captain George K."), [1970] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 21 (Q.B. 1969).
70. Hellenic Lines v. United States, 512 F.2d 1196, 1211 n.28 (2d Cir. 1975). Cases in
which a surcharge was authorized by express provisions of a shipowner's tariffs and bill of
lading must of course be distinguished. See, e.g., C. H. Leavell & Co. v. Hellenic Lines, 13
F.M.C. 76 (1969).
71. The negative implication of Judge Friendly's statement-that vessels that had not yet
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C. Mistake, Asserted in the Course of Performance
The logic of the windfall principle suggests that if discharge by rea-
son of mistake or frustration will operate to interrupt a contract in the
course of performance, the proper remedy is to leave the parties where
they stand-neither requiring them to continue nor attempting restitu-
tion for part performance on either side. The contract interrupted in the
course of performance is the typical setting of the claim of frustration,
and cases involving part performance are relatively infrequent where the
claim of discharge is based on mistake. Those that do occur include text-
book examples of the judicial inclination to let losses lie where they fall.72
One context in which interrupted performance can be attributed to
mutual mistake involves mineral leases. The lessee in the typical case has
agreed to pay a stated royalty per ton of minerals extracted, with a mini-
mum annual payment for a stated number of years; payments have been
made for some portion of the lease term when the leased deposits are
unexpectedly exhausted. If relief is granted on the grounds of mutual
mistake, the normal remedy is a partial rescission, discharging the obliga-
tions of both parties with respect to the remaining lease term only.73 It is
easier to see why such a disposition makes sense than it is to explain,
without reference to the windfall principle, how the parties' mutual mis-
left port at the time of the crisis were in some instances permitted to recover a surcharge for
the Cape voyage--suggests a particularly choice illustration of the windfall principle. This
branch of the proposition is impossible to test, however, since there are no reported cases
involving frustration of a charter party in the circumstances supposed. Glidden Co. v. Hel-
lenic Lines, 275 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1960) considers a charterer's suit against a shipowner who
refused to perform after closure of the Canal in 1956, claiming discharge by frustration. But
the court's decision (awarding damages to the charterer) turns on a finding that the risk of
closure had been specifically addressed in the course of negotiation and implicitly allocated to
the shipowner. Id. at 256-58. The absence of litigated cases in which the shipowner has as-
serted a claim for extra freight before loading the vessel is probably explained by practical
considerations. If the Canal is closed before the vessel has been loaded, the shipowner's claim
of frustration may appear significantly stronger; and the charterer can test his legal position
only at the cost of a delay in shipment.
72. In Clayburg v. Whitt, 171 N.W.2d 623 (Iowa 1969), a contract for the sale of shares
in a grain elevator company was challenged on the grounds of mutual mistake as to (1) the
quantities of grain in storage and (2) the accuracy of the company's financial statements. Sell-
ers sued for the $60,000 unpaid balance of the purchase price; buyers counter-claimed for
rescission and return of a $25,000 down-payment. Ia at 624. Finding that "[s]everal people
made many mistakes," the court denied all relief, stating that "equity should do nothing to
help any of the parties out of a bad deal." Ia at 633. Cf Anderco, Inc. v. Buildex Design,
Inc., 538 F. Supp. 1139, 1142 (D.D.C. 1982) (denying recovery to both parties following part
performance of construction "contract" that parties mistakenly believed they had entered
into).
73. See, e.g., Adams v. Washington Brick, Lime & Mfg. Co., 38 Wash. 243, 249, 80 P.
446, 447 (1905).
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take as to a basic assumption results in a contract that is part valid and
part void.74
One of the most celebrated mistake cases, Smith v. Zimbalist,75
presents a contract of sale interrupted after part performance and (read-
ing between the lines) a "windfall" disposition. Zimbalist, a renowned
concert violinist, purchased from Smith two violins that Zimbalist identi-
fied, and both parties mistakenly regarded, as the work of Stradivari and
Guarneri. Smith was a collector, not a dealer, and the trial court found
as a fact that he had made no representation or warranty as to the prove-
nance of the violins. Zimbalist took the violins, paying $2,000 down and
promising to pay a balance of $6,000 in monthly installments. Smith
agreed that Zimbalist might exchange the instruments in question "for
any others in my collection should he so desire." Subsequent inquiry
established "by a preponderance of evidence," though expert opinion was
apparently divided, that the violins were imitations worth at most $300.
Smith sued to recover the unpaid balance of the contract price. The trial
court gave judgment for Zimbalist on the ground of mutual mistake.76
Although plausible grounds might have been adduced in Smith v.
Zimbalist either for unwinding the transaction or for pushing it forward,
both trial and appellate courts seem to have left the parties precisely
where they stood. Zimbalist, who was doubtless embarrassed by the af-
fair, does not appear to have asserted any counterclaim. Still, if the con-
tract was void for mistake (and all the more if Smith gave an implied
warranty), it is curious to see no reference in the opinion to Zimbalist's
right to restitution of the $2,000 already paid. Conversely, it would have
been reasonable to see an express but limited warranty in Smith's prom-
ise to let Zimbalist exchange the violins for any others in the collection.
On this view of the matter, the risk of inauthenticity was allocated, and a
remedy provided, by an agreement of the parties that the court had only
to enforce. Instead, regarding the contract as void for mistake, the
74. In Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 156 P. 458 (1916), the court
discharged the obligations of a contractor who removed only half the agreed-upon amount of
gravel because the rest turned out to be under water. While the decision is commonly cited as
the source of the "commercial impracticability" standard, see, eg., JOHN E. MURRAY, JR.,
CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 618 (4th ed. 1991), the reasoning of mutual mistake
(i.e., a mistake as to the quantity of gravel recoverable by ordinary means) was given equal
prominence in the opinion. Mineral Park 172 Cal. at 292-93, 156 P. 459-60. The difficulty of
deciding whether the problem in Mineral Park stemmed from a mistaken assumption about
geology (existing fact) or about the likely cost of performance (prediction) illustrates the arbi-
trary nature of the traditional categories.
75. 2 Cal. App. 2d 324, 38 P.2d 170 (1934).
76. Id. at 325-27, 38 P.2d at 170-71. The trial court judgment was affirmed on appeal,
though apparently on a theory of implied warranty. Id. at 333, 38 P.2d at 174.
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courts left the windfall loss to be shared by the parties as chance had
already determined. This is as it should be, since if the claim of a seller's
warranty is rigorously excluded, the facts of the case afford no more basis
for readjusting the incidence of the loss than if the same loss had fallen
either all to Smith (supposing his prized violins had been identified as
worthless fakes the day before Zimbalist came to see them) or all to
Zimbalist (supposing the same discovery after delivery and payment were
complete).
D. Frustration, Asserted in the Course of Performance
The coronation of King Edward VII was to be celebrated by proces-
sions through the streets of London on June 26 and 27, 1902, with a
naval review and "illumination of the fleet" to be held at Spithead (near
the Isle of Wight) on June 28. Many contracts were entered into in antic-
ipation of these festivities. Some owners or tenants of property com-
manding a good view of the parade route hired out rooms at high prices;
others built grandstands, had tickets printed and sold seats; shipowners
chartered vessels to organizers of pleasure cruises, who offered the public
the opportunity to observe the naval exercises. Many of those hiring
rooms or chartering ships subsequently contracted with caterers to sup-
ply refreshments to their paying or invited guests. The contracts memo-
rializing these arrangements employed a predictable variety of payment
terms: some required full payment in advance, others payment in install-
ments, with final payment due in some cases on the day of the great event
and in others some time before. Few of them contained any provision to
govern the rights of the parties in the event the celebrations did not take
place.
On June 25 it was announced that because of the King's illness the
processions and naval review would be canceled. The resulting litiga-
tion-a handful of decisions known collectively as the "Coronation
Cases" 77-is best known today as a landmark in the liberalizing process
by which an older and narrower defense of "impossibility" expanded to
include modern-day "frustration" and "impracticability. ' 78 But the sig-
77. See generally R.G. McElroy & Glanville Williams, The Coronation Cases, 4 MOD. L.
R v. 241 (1941). Additional background information may be gleaned from the opinions in the
Coronation Cases themselves. McElroy and Williams identify and cite eleven Coronation
Cases, id. nn.18-21.
78. The principal holding of the best known of the Coronation Cases, Krell v. Henry,
[1903] 2 K.B. 740 (C.A.), was that the cancellation of the processions discharged defendant's
obligation to pay the balance due under a contract for the hire of rooms from which to observe
them. The significance of the decision lay in the ground on which it was based by Lord Justice
Vaughan Williams: not that performance had been rendered objectively impossible, but that
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nificance of the Coronation Cases for the exploration of the windfall
principle lies in their treatment of the restitution problems created by the
various contracts under which money had been paid in advance in antici-
pation of an event that was now not going to take place.
The terms of the transaction in Chandler v. Webster,7 9 the principal
decision on this aspect of the problem, were set forth in a letter of confir-
mation written by the plaintiff on June 10: "1 beg to confirm my purchase
of the first-floor room of the Electric Lighting Board at 7, Pall Mall, to
view the procession on Thursday, June 26, for the sum of £141 15s.,
which amount is now due." °80 The amount of £100 had been paid at the
time the cancellation of the procession was announced. Plaintiff sued to
recover this amount, on a theory of failure of consideration; defendant
counter-claimed for the unpaid balance of £41 15s. The Court of Appeal
held for defendant on both claims.8 1 This result is fully in accordance
with the windfall principle, since recovery of the unpaid balance de-
pended on a finding that it was due and payable before the procession
was canceled.82
The allocation of windfall losses in Chandler v. Webster and the
other Coronation Cases is simple and symmetrical. Amounts due and
payable prior to the time at which a contract is frustrated remain due; if
previously paid, they cannot be recovered.8 3 Liability for any payment
"the object of the contract was frustrated by the non-happening of the coronation." Ia at 754.
The rationale was unnecessarily broad. Krell v. Henry might have been decided the same way,
with less damage to existing doctrine, by observing that the subject matter of the contract
(rooms from which a coronation procession might be viewed on June 26 and 27) had been
destroyed, as surely as was the music hall in Taylor v. Caldwell, thereby discharging both
parties from further performance as in the case of destruction of specific goods. Lord Justice
Vaughan Williams preferred to explain the decision by an interpretation of Taylor v. Caldwell
according to which the parties' obligations are discharged when a "state of things or condi-
tion" with respect to which they have implicitly contracted "fails and prevents the achieve-
ment of that which was, in the contemplation of both parties, the foundation of the contract."
Ia As observed in a well-known commentary, "the fiction of Taylor v. Caldwell" (as to the
existence of implied conditions excusing performance) was thereafter "without limit." McEl-
roy & Williams, supra note 77, at 252.
79. [1904] 1 K.B. 493 (C.A.).
80. ad at 494.
81. Id. at 501-02.
82. The action for amounts due but unpaid at the moment of frustration must be allowed
if the courts are to avoid a rule favoring the dilatory over the conscientious debtor. More
importantly, enforcement of the matured obligation, though it might seem inconsistent with a
principle favoring judicial inertia, gives effect to the parties' privately negotiated, ex-ante allo-
cation of the incidence of possible loss should their contract be frustrated. See infra at 49-52.
83. See Civil Serv. Co-op. Soc'y v. General Steam Navigation Co., [1903] 2 K.B. 756
(C.A.) (hire under charter party paid in full ten days in advance, not recoverable upon cancel-
lation); Blakeley v. Muller & Co., [1903] 2 K.B. 760 n.4 (tickets for grandstand seats not
refundable upon cancellation of procession); Lumsden v. Barton & Co., 19 T.L.R. 53 (K.B.
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due thereafter is discharged.84 The incidence of the casualty-the dead-
weight loss resulting from the King's illness-is left to be apportioned
exclusively as a function of the parties' private arrangements.
A passage in the opinion of Collins, Master of the Rolls, became
known as "the Rule of Chandler v. Webster":
[W]here, from causes outside the volition of the parties, something
which was the basis of, or essential to the fulfilment of, the contract,
has become impossible, so that, from the time when the fact of that
impossibility has been ascertained, the contract can no further be per-
formed by either party, it remains a perfectly good contract up to that
point, and everything previously done in pursuance of it must be
treated as rightly done, but the parties are both discharged from fur-
ther performance of it.... The rule adopted by the Courts in such
cases is I think to some extent an arbitrary one, the reason for its adop-
tion being that it is really impossible in such cases to work out with
any certainty what the rights of the parties in the event which has
happened should be. Time has elapsed, and the position of both par-
ties may have been more or less altered, and it is impossible to adjust
or ascertain the rights of the parties with exactitude. That being so,
the law treats everything that has already been done in pursuance of
the contract as validly done, but relieves the parties of further responsi-
bility under it.8 5
Applied to run-of-the-mill frustration cases, in which parties not infre-
quently walk away from a deal after part performance on either side,
Collins's explanation appears both insightful and noncontroversial.
When the remaining term of a lease is discharged because the building
has been destroyed by fire,8 6 or a contractor is permitted to cut short his
1902) (same). Krell v. Henry originally involved a counterclaim by the defendant for return of
his down payment. By the time the case reached the Court of Appeal this counterclaim had
been withdrawn, perhaps in recognition of the contrary course of decisions. Krell, [1903] 2
K.B. at 754.
By contrast, sums paid at a time when the processions had already been canceled, but
before that fact was publicly known, were held recoverable on a theory of pre-existing impossi-
bility or mutual mistake. See Griffith v. Brymer, 19 T.L.R. 434, 434 (K.B. 1903); cf Clark v.
Lindsay, 19 T.L.R. 202, 203 (K.B. 1903). These decisions were influenced by the traditional
rule according to which money paid for something that had ceased to exist was recoverable as
on a failure of consideration. See, in particular, Strickland v. Turner, 155 Eng. Rep. 919 (Ex.
1852), which allowed recovery of the purchase price of an existing annuity on the life of a third
person who, unknown to the parties in England, had died in Australia during the negotiation
of the transaction. Id. at 924. The timing of the transaction in Griffith arguably made the case
one of strict failure of consideration (as Chandler, it will be argued, was not), thereby justifying
restitution in the former case but not in the latter.
84. Krell, [1903] 2 K.B. at 754.
85. Chandler, [1904] 1 K.B. at 499-500.
86. See Albert M. Greenfield & Co. v. Kolea, 475 Pa. 351, 380 A.2d 758 (1976). See also
La Cumbre Golf & Country Club v. Santa Barbara Hotel Co., 205 Cal. 422, 425, 271 P. 476,
477 (1928) (destruction by fire of defendant's hotel discharges its remaining obligations to pay
plaintiff a monthly fee for golf privileges for hotel guests).
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performance because the work has become too expensive to continue,87
the law's disinclination to compel any more elaborate accounting be-
tween the parties fits Collins's description precisely. This quick, rough-
justice means of sending the parties on their way seems so natural that its
windfall character may pass unnoticed.18
In the context of the Coronation Cases, however, where its applica-
tion seemed to award an undeserved gain to owners of rooms at the ex-
pense of disappointed hirers, this statement of the law was regarded as
little short of barbaric. When the House of Lords later interpreted Scot-
tish law to permit recovery of an installment payment under a frustrated
contract-distinguishing, without reexamining, the contrary English au-
thorities-the rule of Chandler v. Webster was described as a maxim for
"tricksters, gamblers, and thieves," leading to "monstrous" results, ac-
cording to which
innocent loss may and must be endured by the one party, and
unearned aggrandisement may and must be secured at his expense to
the other party....
No doubt the adjustment of rights after the occurrence of distur-
bances, interruptions, or calamities, is in many cases a difficult task.
But the law of Scotland does not throw up its hands in despair in con-
sequence, and leave the task alone.89
Chandler v. Webster was subsequently disapproved by the House of
Lords and further interred by Act of Parliament.9"
The usual reaction to Chandler v. Webster is that it is unfair to be
required to pay to see a procession that will no longer take place, and
that anyone receiving such a payment is being unjustly enriched. The
87. See Mineral Park Land Co. v. Howard, 172 Cal. 289, 293, 156 P. 458, 459-60 (1916).
Compare Richardson Lumber Co. v. Hoey, 219 Mich. 643, 189 N.W. 923 (1922), involving the
sale of a specified lot of railroad ties to be loaded and removed by the buyer. Buyer had taken
only a portion when the remainder was destroyed by fire; he tendered payment for this quan-
tity only. Although the court found that title to the entire lot had already passed, it held (by a
tenuous theory of mutual mistake) that the buyer was entitled to a partial rescission, excusing
payment for the ties destroyed by fire. Id at 646-50, 189 N.W. at 924-25.
88. Given the option, at the outset, of contracting for the part performance that frustra-
tion will in fact leave them, it is by no means clear that the parties would make their deal on
the same terms, or indeed at all. Moreover, were the parties to become aware, prior to per-
formance, of the circumstances by which their existing contract would later be "frustrated,"
the party adversely affected could presumably obtain rescission on the grounds of mutual mis-
take or existing impossibility. Analytical consistency might suggest that a frustrated contract
be regarded as void ab initio (as if the mistake had been discovered prior to performance),
leaving the parties to pursue cross-claims in restitution for benefits respectively conferred. The
fact that the law does not proceed in this fashion shows the influence of the windfall principle.
89. Cantiare San Rocco, S.A. v. Clyde Shipbuilding & Eng'g Co., 1924 App. Cas. 226,
258-60 (Scot. 1923) (Lord Shaw of Dunfermline).
90. See infra notes 121-128 and accompanying text.
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position of the common law is that no one is unjustly enriched by the
mere circumstance that a casualty bears more heavily on one party to a
contract than on another, and that there is no greater justice to be had by
adjusting the burden between the parties. The traditional rule is hard
and counterintuitive, but not necessarily wrong. The controversy sur-
rounding the Coronation Cases is fundamentally a dispute over the ap-
propriate threshold for judicial intervention to shift losses.
To understand Chandler v. Webster we must recognize the sense in
which the proprietor of the premises, though allowed to retain a benefit
at the expense of the other party, was nevertheless not unjustly enriched.
When the coronation processions were first announced, the fortunate ten-
ants of No. 7, Pall Mall, like everyone else in London with a good view of
the route, suddenly owned a valuable asset that they might consume
themselves (by watching the processions) or sell. Though this asset came
to them by the purest windfall, it was entitled to no less protection than
any other species of property. When the processions were canceled, eve-
ryone in London who by then had the right to watch them-whether
that right had been obtained by luck, or whether it had been bought and
paid for-suffered the same casualty loss. Anyone who had paid £100 to
hire someone else's rooms obviously suffered a loss of £100, but so did
every proprietor of comparable rooms who had not sold his rights-
either because he was going to enjoy the procession himself (at an oppor-
tunity cost of £100 pounds) or because he intended to sell at a later date.
The incidence of the casualty, consisting in the destruction of a transfera-
ble asset, was simply an application of the rule resperit domino: the loss
from the destruction of property is for the account of the owner. The
determination of who "owned" the opportunity to view the procession
was a function of chance (the timing of the King's illness) and of the
allocation of the risk of loss effected by the parties' payment terms.
The implicit logic of Chandler v. Webster recalls Paradine v. Jane,91
where a tenant was held liable for rent on land from which he had been
forcibly expelled by the royalist army during the English Civil War. The
strongest reason for the holding is not the fictitious rule that contractual
liability is absolute; nor even the more vital idea that a person wishing to
undertake a qualified obligation should write his own conditions since
"the law [will] not protect him beyond his own agreement. '92 The best
explanation is that the tenant, as temporary owner of the premises, has
both "the advantage of casual profits" and "the hazard of casual losses"
for the duration of the lease term, since he stands precisely in the position
91. 82 Eng. Rep. 897 (K.B. 1647).
92. Id. at 898.
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of the owner of the fee had there been no lease.93 The tenant's loss, in
this view, is no more unfair than any other destruction of property (by
unavoidable casualty) occurring shortly after its purchase from the prior
owner; and there is no more reason to shift it in the one case than in the
other.
Paradine v. Jane is made easier to explain by the traditional con-
cepts of property law, according to which the tenant is in truth the
"owner" of the property for a term of years; but the lesson it teaches
about "casual losses" is in no way dependent on the specialized law of
estates. The relation of landlord and tenant is merely one familiar exam-
ple of circumstances linking two parties in a contractual relation in such
a way that if one suffers a casualty related to the subject matter of their
bargain, the other may be thought to be under some obligation to share
the loss. 94 The idea that it is somehow not fair to require the tenant to
pay rent for land from which he has been forcibly expelled by a third
party, and the idea that the plaintiff in Chandler v. Webster should not be
held to his contract for the hiring of a room from which no procession
will be visible, are thus fundamentally the same; but such circumstances
are by no means limited to the context of leases and licenses of real prop-
erty. The same impulse lies behind the rule of law that allows a recovery
to the worker who has expended time and materials in constructing an
addition to a building, under a contract calling for payment on comple-
tion, only to see the building destroyed before the completion of his un-
dertaking; or (conversely) to the owner who has paid in advance, in full,
for the same work of construction.
Long before the Coronation Cases, the decision whether or not to
allow recovery in such circumstances was recognized as a choice that
could reasonably be made either way. The divergent tendencies of the
civil and the common law on this question marked one of the characteris-
tic differences between the two legal systems. In deciding that the casu-
alty to leased property would be left to fall pro tanto on the tenant, the
common law rejected the uniform civil law tradition that abated the rent
even for such seemingly lesser casualties as the failure of a crop or the
destruction of a building.95 Underlying the civil law rule was the reason-
93. Id.
94. Professor Fried offers an explicit defense of "the principle of sharing" as the source of
remedies for frustrated contracts, arguing that the parties to a contract are "joined in a com-
mon enterprise, [with] some obligation to share unexpected benefits and losses in the case of an
accident in the course of that enterprise." FRIED, supra note 4, at 72.
95. DIG. 19.2.15 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 32) offers examples of casualties said to justify a
whole or partial remission of rent. The rule was uniformly adopted in civil law jurisdictions.
See, ag., CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 1722 (France); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2697 (West
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able proposition that the landlord's undertaking, intrinsic to the lease
transaction, was to afford the tenant not the bare title but the enjoyment
ordinarily to be expected from the leased property. 96 The contrasting
common law rule did not controvert this proposition so much as it ad-
vanced a contrary insight, no less reasonable: that outside the agreement
of the parties there could be no just basis for interfering with the natural
incidence, inherently fortuitous, of the casualty loss. 97
In the generation before Chandler v. Webster, the rigorous applica-
tion of this antirestitutionary logic had, on full consideration, been con-
firmed as English law. In Appleby v. Myers,98 plaintiffs, a firm of
engineers, had contracted to erect a steam engine and associated machin-
ery on the defendant's premises. The work to be done was specifically
described under ten headings, with a price expressly stated for each; the
total contract price amounted to £459, payable on completion. When the
work was nearly finished, an accidental fire resulted in the total destruc-
tion of defendant's premises, including the work in progress. Plaintiffs
sought to recover £419 on account of work done and materials provided.
The question submitted to the court was whether, under these circum-
stances, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the whole or any portion of
the contract price.99
On the first hearing of the case, in the Court of Common Pleas,
plaintiffs obtained judgment for a part of the contract price proportional
to the extent of the work done.lc0 The theory of the decision, not very
satisfactory, was that there was an implied promise by the defendant to
provide and maintain the buildings where the machinery was to be er-
1952); GEORGE J. BELL, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SCOTLAND § 1208 (W. Guthrie 10th ed.
1899).
96. "[O]portere enim agrum praestari conductor) utfruipossit." ("For [the nature of the
lease transaction is such that] the land is to be furnished to the lessee for his use and enjoy-
ment.") DIG. at 19.2.15.2. The logic of the modem, lease-as-contract decisions in landlord-
tenant cases is not fundamentally different. See, eg., Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428
F.2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir.) (in modem lease transaction, tenants seek not "an interest in
land" but "a well known package of goods and services"), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970).
97. A frequent observation was that the tenant lost his term while the landlord lost his
reversion:
The reason in equity is, that in case of the destruction of the property, the loss of
the rent must fall somewhere, and there is no more equity that the landlord should
bear it than the tenant, when the tenant has expressly agreed to pay it, and when the
landlord must bear the loss of the property destroyed. Equity considers the calamity
mutual.
White v. Molyneux, 2 Ga. 124, 127 (1847).
98. 1 L.R.-C.P. 615 (1866), rev'd, 2 L.R.-C.P. 651 (Ex. Ch. 1867).
99. Id. at 621.
100. Id.
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ected.10 1 Defending this judgment on appeal, counsel for plaintiffs
sought safer but still precarious ground. The "true principle" explaining
the liability of the owner, they asserted, was an implied promise, not to
maintain the premises where work was to be done, but to pay for work
done and materials supplied in the event performance of the contract
should be prevented by vis major. In support of this contention counsel
appealed frankly to the civil law authorities, offering lengthy citations to
the Digest, to Pothier, and to contemporary commentators on the French
civil code.102 The Exchequer Chamber, per Justice Blackburn, 10 3 de-
clined altogether to entertain this view of the question. While a contract
to do work and supply materials might be (and frequently was) made on
a basis that entitled the contractor to recover for the value of each part
accomplished, without regard to the completion of the whole, the court
found evidence of a contrary intention in the understanding that pay-
ment would be due only on completion of the work. "[T]here is nothing
to render it either illegal or absurd in the workman to agree to complete
the whole, and be paid when the whole is complete, and not till then:
and we think the plaintiffs in the present case had entered into such a
contract."104 On this view of the case, performance of the contract had
been interrupted by a supervening casualty, the risk of which had not
been allocated by the parties' express or implied undertakings. As in
Paradine v. Jane, the fortuitous incidence of the loss would be left
undisturbed:
We think that where, as in the present case, the premises are destroyed
without fault on either side, it is a misfortune equally affecting both
parties; excusing both from further performance of the contract, but
giving a cause of action to neither.10 5
The converse of Appleby v. Myers, and a closer analogy to the prob-
lem addressed in Chandler v. Webster, is the case in which a plaintiff
seeks to recover sums paid in advance after the defendant's performance
101. Id. at 622.
102. 2 L.R.-C.P. at 653-57. Counsel's impressive display of learning is at least partly ex-
plained by the contemporary popularity of Story on Bailments, in which many of the authori-
ties were collected. Following the authority of the Digest, Story analyzed these cases of
supervening casualty (which we classify today within the subjects of contract and restitution)
in terms of the Roman law of "Locatio Operis, or the Hiring of Labor and Services." See
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS §§ 421, 426-27 (5th ed. 1851).
103. As the author of the opinions in Taylor v. Caldwell (discussed supra text accompany-
ing notes 57-62), Kennedy v. Panama Mail Co. (discussed supra text accompanying notes 36-
38) and Appleby v. Meyers, Sir Colin Blackburn of the Court of Queen's Bench appears to have
shaped almost single-handedly the rules of mistake and frustration for the classical era of
contract law.
104. Appleby, 2 L.R.-C.P. at 660.
105. Id. at 659.
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has been discharged by supervening casualty. Recovery was denied in
this situation in two leading cases: Whincup v. Hughes06 and Anglo-
Egyptian Navigation Co. v. Rennie. 10 7 In Whincup, plaintiff apprenticed
his son to a watchmaker for a six-year term, paying the full premium of
£25 in advance; after furnishing the first year of instruction, the master
died. In Anglo-Egyptian, defendants (a firm of engineers) agreed to con-
struct and install new boilers on plaintiff's steamship, for a price payable
in installments. When the greater part of the price had been paid, and
the greater part of the work had been done (but before the boilers had
been installed in the ship), the vessel was lost at sea. It was held in both
cases that the contract was frustrated after part performance: specifi-
cally, that the performing party's remaining obligation was discharged by
supervening impossibility. In both cases, the Court of Common Pleas
denied any recovery to plaintiffs for money had and received. Thus the
watchmaker's estate was under no obligation to refund any part of the
£25 premium; and the engineers presumably enjoyed a windfall from the
resale of the valuable boilers, since they had already received installment
payments nearly equivalent to the cost of the work done.
The decisions may appear surprising today, but their reasoning is
instructive. In both cases the judges were reluctant to calculate the cost
or value of the part performance because of the impossibility of doing so
with precision. The court in Whincup stressed the difficulty of appor-
tioning the apprentice's premium between the periods before and after
the master's death. A simple pro rata calculation was unacceptable un-
less the consideration was "in its nature apportionable"; this was not the
case here, since the apprentice would presumably cost the master more
trouble, with less reward, at the outset of the relationship. 08 In Anglo-
Egyptian, where the commercial subject matter might be thought capable
of easier valuation, the court still balked at the task: the boilers "may
have been either of more or less value" than the installments paid in
respect thereof, "or of more or less profit or loss relatively to the rest of
the subject-matter of the contract."1 9
By modem standards, this reluctance to appraise on the ground that
the appraisal cannot be made with precision looks excessively fastidious.
But the judges of the Court of Common Pleas were pursuing an altera-
tive approach to the problem, one that obviated any need for judicial
valuation and its attendant imperfections. The undisturbed allocation of
106. 6 L.R.-C.P. 78 (1871).
107. 10 L.R.-C.P. 271 (1875).
108. Whincup, 6 L.R.-C.P. at 81, 86.
109. Anglo-Egyptian, 10 L.R.-C.P. at 284.
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loss from either of these frustrated contracts was unimpeachably just if it
could be viewed as the product of the parties' agreement. It could be so
viewed if the parties were merely presumed to know what they were do-
ing. Thus the articles of apprenticeship contained no provision for repay-
ment of the premium in the event of the death of either master or
apprentice, though such a term could easily have been included. The
contract was therefore to be read as assigning to the plaintiff the entire
risk of frustration from either cause. 110 Similarly, the court construed
the contract in Anglo-Egyptian as providing that title to the boilers
should not pass until they were actually installed in the vessel, as against
the plaintiff's contention that title passed as each boiler was certified to
meet specifications and paid for.1" The effect of this provision, under a
legal regime excluding judicial intervention to reapportion losses incident
to a frustrated contract, was to provide the performing party with nearly
complete security against any loss from the interruption of the contract
prior to full performance; excluding, for example, any risk that his ex-
penses and ratable profit might outrun the installments already paid at
any point. The resulting protection is close to what a performing party
would obtain by insisting on full and nonrefundable payment in advance.
Such generous protection for performing parties may be unusual, but
there is nothing unreasonable about it if we can assume it is what the
parties intended.
The results strike us as harsh because we doubt that the paying par-
ties in these cases intended to offer such generous guarantees. But the
Court of Common Pleas was announcing what would today be called a
"default rule" for the guidance of other contracting parties in the future.
The rule was a very simple one: courts would not intervene to shift gains
and losses from a frustrated contract. The result was that the allocation
of such gains and losses would necessarily be a function of the parties'
contract; which the parties, knowing the rule, were thus made free to
specify however and to whatever extent they might wish. The judges
insisted, in short, that the ultimate outcome be exclusively a function of
the parties' private arrangements; and they appear to have realized that
they could achieve this result only by excluding the possibility of judicial
intervention. 112
110. Whincup, 6 L.R.-C.P. at 83-84, 85.
111. Anglo-Egyptian, 10 L.R.-C.P. at 283; cf Anglo-Egyptian Navigation Co. v. Rennie,
10 L.R.-C.P. 571 (Ex. Ch. 1875).
112. In effect, the method of the Court of Common Pleas in all three cases-Appleby,
Whincup, and Anglo-Egyptian-was simply to deny that the contracts contained "gaps" need-
ing to be filled by judicial intervention. If a legal regime excludes by presumption the possibil-
ity of "incomplete" contracts, the result is a default rule that losses of this kind will lie where
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The English rule for regulating the consequences of frustrated con-
tracts, "stated broadly" in a Massachusetts decision of 1891, was thus
"that the loss must remain where it first falls, and that neither of the
parties can recover of the other for anything done under the contract."' 13
Most American jurisdictions (Massachusetts included) disapproved the
English rule, at least where it operated to deny recovery to builders and
engineers whose work was interrupted by the destruction of the defend-
ant's premises. 114 The majority American rule clearly favored contrac-
tors over owners in these disputes, perhaps because owners were more
likely to be insured against the loss; though the courts' reluctance to ac-
knowledge that the fact of insurance had anything to do with the out-
come left the reasoning of the opinions somewhat thin. 115 In the
minority of American jurisdictions willing to leave these losses where
they first fell, both the authority and the reasoning of the English cases
were clearly influential. 116
they fall in the absence of some contractual allocation. The effect of such a default rule is to
oblige contracting parties (whether they wish to or not) to allocate for themselves both the
identifiable risks of frustration, and the incidence of loss should the contract be frustrated
nevertheless. See infra Part III.(C).
113. Butterfield v. Byron, 153 Mass. 517, 522, 27 N.E. 667, 668 (1891).
114. See Annotation, Who Must Bear the Loss from Destruction of or Damage to Building
During Performance of Building Contract, Without Fault of Either Party, 53 A.L.R. 103, 116-
28 (1928); authorities cited infra note 118.
115. In Butterfield, for many years the leading American case, a passing remark at the end
of the opinion reveals that the real parties in interest were the builder and the owner's insurers.
153 Mass. at 524, 27 N.E. at 669. Butterfield advanced the view that upon the discharge by
supervening impossibility of a contract for the construction of a hotel, to which both the owner
and the builder were to contribute work and materials, there was "an implied assumpsit for
what has properly been done by either of them; the law dealing with it as done at the request of
another, and creating a liability to pay for it its value." Id. at 523, 27 N.E. at 669.
116. The leading case for the minority rule is Krause v. Board of Trustees, 162 Ind. 278,
70 N.E. 264 (1904), involving a contract to construct an annex to a building that was later
destroyed by fire. On the issue of restitution for the builder's partial performance the Indiana
court rejected Butterfield v. Byron in favor of Appleby v. Meyers, approving the following state-
ment from a contemporary treatise: "In a case of this nature, the defendant [owner] receives
no benefit, and if he is equally blameless and irresponsible for the accident by which the prop-
erty is destroyed, why should not the law leave the parties as it finds them, and let each suffer
his own loss?" Id. at 296-97, 70 N.E. at 270 (quoting 15 AMERICAN & ENGLISH ENCYCLOPE-
DIA OF LAW 1090 (2d ed. 1900)). For modern Indiana authority see Hipskind Heating &
Plumbing Co. v. General Indus., 136 Ind. App. 647, 194 N.E.2d 733 (1963), transfer denied,
246 Ind. 215, 204 N.E.2d 339 (1965). See also Taulbee v. McCarty, 144 Ky. 199, 137 S.W.
1045 (1911) (contract to raise house and insert new foundation; no recovery for partial per-
formance prior to destruction by casualty); Siegel, Cooper & Co. v. Eaton & Prince Co., 165
Ill. 550, 46 N.E. 449 (1897) (installation of elevator); Brumby v. Smith, 3 Ala. 123 (1841)
(carpentry work on a house destroyed by fire); cf Automobile Ins. Co. v. Model Family Laun-
dries, 133 Conn. 433, 440, 52 A.2d 137, 139 (1947) (denying recovery for storage of fur coat
during period prior to destruction of coat by fire).
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In nonbuilding cases, where insurance is less obviously a factor, the
American decisions on the consequences of frustration offer some pleas-
ing illustrations of the windfall principle. 117 But the overall weight of
American authority unquestionably favors a more liberal allowance of
restitution to adjust the losses attendant upon frustrated contracts. 118
Many of the decisions in this category may be reconciled with the
windfall principle because they arise in circumstances where the alterna-
tive to restitution is prima facie unjust enrichment. It is relatively easy to
justify recovery for partial performance of a contract for personal serv-
ices that has been interrupted by the death of the performing party;1 19 or
for the value of benefits already conferred when the return performance
agreed upon becomes illegal or impossible.120 By contrast, if the first
party to a frustrated contract has conferred a benefit and the second
party has partly performed, or has incurred expenses preparatory to per-
formance, the extent of unjust enrichment (if any) will be highly prob-
lematic. The windfall principle of the traditional common law resolves
this difficulty by denying restitution, leaving the parties to their own allo-
cation of frustration losses through such devices as progress or install-
ment payments. The more liberal, restitutionary tendencies of the
modern decisions support a higher degree of judicial intervention, shift-
117. In Shear v. Wright, 60 Mich. 159, 26 N.W. 871 (1886), plaintiff sold a bull calf for
$10, of which defendant paid $6 in cash; the balance was payable in the form of breeding
services to be performed by the calf when grown. Before this could occur, the calf died. Held,
in a suit to recover the $4 balance, that "the contract was released by the impossibility of
performance," id. at 161, 26 N.W. at 872, making a homely but accurate analogy to Krell v.
Henry. See also Perlee v. Jeffcott, 89 N.J.L. 34, 97 A. 789 (1916) (denying recovery of balance
due on an option to purchase a farm, the buildings having been destroyed during the option
term, purportedly on the authority of the Coronation Cases). A better and more recent anal-
ogy to the Coronation Cases appears in Alabama Football, Inc. v. Wright, 452 F. Supp. 182
(N.D. Tex. 1977), aff'd, 607 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir. 1979). Finding that a professional football
contract was frustrated by the failure of the league in which the player was to be employed, the
court denied both the employer's claim for restitution of a bonus paid upon the signing of the
contract and the player's counterclaim for breach. Id at 185.
118. See generally 6 CORBIN, supra note 1, §§ 1370-1372; PALMER, supra note 25, § 7.1.
The preference for restitution in this context has had the consistent support of the American
Law Institute. See REsTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 468 (1932); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITU-
TION § 108(c) (1936); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 377 (1979).
119. See PALMER, supra note 25, § 7.7, and cases cited therein.
120. See Louisville & N.R.R. v. Crowe, 156 Ky. 27, 160 S.W. 759 (1913) (railroad
promises annual pass for life in exchange for easement; issuance of such passes later prohibited
by act of Congress; landowner allowed restitution for value of easement, less value of passes
previously issued). For a surprising instance of contrary authority see Gold v. Salem Lutheran
Home Ass'n, 53 Cal. 2d 289, 347 P.2d 687, 1 Cal. Rptr. 343 (1959), holding that a contract for
lifetime nursing home care (in effect, an annuity) to commence infuturo was not frustrated by
the death of the annuitant prior to the commencement date, and therefore that the price paid
in advance could not be recovered. Id at 291-92, 347 P.2d at 689, 1 Cal. Rptr. at 345.
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ing losses to achieve a more equitable sharing of burdens by the parties.
The question ultimately to be considered is whether this expenditure of
judicial resources is worthwhile.
The majority of American jurisdictions have long answered this
question in the affirmative. In England, where the contrary answer had
deeper support in the cases, formal adherence to the windfall principle
was ended by the decision of the House of Lords in Fibrosa S.A. v.
Fairbarn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd., 121 in which Chandler v. Webster
was expressly disapproved. 122
In July 1939, plaintiff, a Polish textile manufacturer, ordered certain
flax-hackling machines to be constructed and installed by defendant, an
English maker of textile machinery. The contract price was £4,800, c.i.f.
Gdynia, payable one-third with order and the balance against shipping
documents. Defendant received an initial payment of £1,000 (instead of
the £1,600 actually due). In September 1939, after the German invasion
of Poland, plaintiff's agents wrote defendant observing that full perform-
ance of the contract had been rendered impossible and requesting the
return of the initial payment. Defendant refused, stating that considera-
ble work had already been done on the machines and offering to recon-
sider the matter after the war. After unsuccessful negotiations, plaintiff
brought suit seeking damages for breach of contract, specific perform-
ance, or return of the £1,000 previously paid. Defendant's position was
that the contract was frustrated, and that under the rule of Chandler v.
Webster it was not obligated to repay the money. The trial court's judg-
ment for defendant on both points was affirmed by the Court of Appeal.
Both courts observed that Chandler v. Webster was binding authority on
the issue of restitution, at least until such time as the House of Lords
might "find themselves able to... substitute a rule like the more civilized
rule of Roman and Scottish law."' 123
The House of Lords declined to follow Chandler v. Webster and or-
dered restitution of the plaintiff's down payment, explaining that the
facts of the case presented "a typical case of a total failure of considera-
121. 1943 App. Cas. 32 (1942).
122. Longstanding dissatisfaction with "the Rule in Chandler v. Webster"-the rule that
"the loss lies where it falls" when a contract is discharged by frustration-was crystallized in
1939 by a report of the Law Revision Committee recommending its abrogation by statute.
LAW REVISION COMM., SEVENTH INTERIM REPORT, 1939, Cmd. 6009. The wartime Parlia-
ment had as yet taken no action on this proposal when the Fibrosa case put the question before
the House of Lords.
123. Fibrosa S.A. v. Fairbaim Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd., [1942] 1 K.B. 12, 28 (C.A.
1941).
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tion,"124 giving rise to a right of restitution under "ordinary and accepted
rules of law."1 25 The result, it was acknowledged, did not necessarily do
justice to the parties: the defendants would have been obliged to refund
the down payment even if they had already expended a greater sum in
the course of part performance. The "more civilized rule" that was
wanted, in the view of their Lordships, was that judges be authorized to
assess the value of performance on either side so as to enforce an equita-
ble composition. In the view of the House of Lords, however, judicial
authority to effect any such equitable apportionment could only be con-
ferred by statute. 126
The choice made in English law some fifty years ago was thus to
replace the rule of the Coronation Cases with the standards of the Law
Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act, 1943.127 The Act provides that if a
contract is frustrated, amounts previously paid and the value of other
benefits conferred shall be recoverable, subject to possible set-off in re-
spect of expenses incurred and benefits conferred by the other party. The
critical determinations and calculations are remitted to the standard of
what the court considers just, "having regard to all the circumstances of
the case."' 128 The charge to do justice under the circumstances is a famil-
iar one to readers of the second Restatement. Indeed, it is the hallmark
of a modem law of contracts in which the certainty of expectations essen-
tial to private ordering is abandoned in favor of flexible standards, to be
applied through judicial discretion in the interest of justice. 129
124. Fibrosa, 1943 App. Cas. at 61 (opinion of Lord Macmillan).
125. Id. at 74 (opinion of Lord Roche). Chandler v. Webster, in this view, was no more
than a curious aberration, since "there was never a clearer case [than Chandler v. Webster] of
money paid for a consideration which had entirely failed." Id. at 60 (Lord Macmillan). It has
already been suggested that this is not an accurate characterization of Chandler v. Webster, see
supra text preceding note 91; a similar objection might be made to the idea that plaintiff
Fibrosa received nothing under its contract. Even were it so, to describe Fibrosa as an instance
of the "ordinary rule" whereby money previously paid may be recovered upon a "total failure
of consideration" puts a questionable gloss on the ordinary rule. Restitution because of "fail-
ure of consideration" usually involves a defendant who obtains money in advance and then
breaches his contract. See Fibrosa, 1943 App. Cas. at 82-83 (opinion'bf Lord Porter).
126. See Fibrosa, 1943 App. Cas. at 49-50 (opinion of Viscount Simon, L.C.); id. at 72
(opinion of Lord Wright). Lord Wright was chairman of the Law Revision Committee whose
report, supra note 122, recommended legislation to abolish the rule of Chandler v. Webster.
127. 6 & 7 Geo. 6, ch. 40.
128. Id. § 1(2).
129. A striking example of the same general development, applied to the subject matter of
the present article, may be seen in the Contractual Mistakes Act 1977, No. 54, N.Z. Stat. 567,
extending to cases of "mistake" the approach of the English Frustrated Contracts Act. In
order to grant relief under New Zealand's Contractual Mistakes Act, a court must find, inter
alia, that:
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The decision by which the House of Lords dismissed Chandler v.
Webster scarcely adverted to the fundamental issues involved. Lord
Wright nevertheless approached the heart of the matter when, referring
to the view that the law of frustration "is explained in theory as a condi-
tion or term of the contract implied by the law ab initio," he added the
following comment:
I do not see any objection to this mode of expression so long as it is
understood that what is implied is what the court thinks the parties
ought to have agreed on the basis of what is fair and reasonable, not
what as individuals they would or might have agreed. "It is," said
Lord Sumner, "irrespective of the individuals concerned, their temper-
aments and failings, their interest and circumstances." The court is
thus taken to assume the r6le of the reasonable man, and decides what
the reasonable man would regard as just on the facts of the case. The
hypothetical "reasonable man" is personified by the court itself. It is
the court which decides. 130
The implications of these suggestions carry much further than the
decision in Fibrosa or even the Frustrated Contracts Act. Where they
lead if taken to an extreme may be seen in a modern decision on commer-
cial impracticability, the celebrated Alcoa case.131 There, the parties en-
tered into a long-term contract by which Alcoa agreed to carry out the
smelting or conversion of large volumes of minerals to be supplied by
Essex. The price for Alcoa's services was fixed by an elaborate indexing
clause. Despite Alcoa's efforts, however, the indexing provision did not
satisfactorily reflect increased costs actually experienced; after several
profitable years, Alcoa's performance under the contract turned sharply
unprofitable. 132 Alcoa brought suit for an "equitable modification of the
contract price," based on allegations of "mutual mistake of fact, unilat-
The mistake or mistakes, as the case may be, resulted at the time of the contract-
(i) In a substantially unequal exchange of values; or
(ii) In the conferment of a benefit, or in the imposition or inclusion of an obliga-
tion, which was, in all the circumstances, a benefit or obligation substantially dispro-
portionate to the consideration therefor.
Id. § 6(l)(b). Where relief is authorized, "[t]he Court shall have discretion to make such order
as it thinks just." Id. § 7(3).
130. Fibrosa, 1943 App. Cas. at 70-71 (quoting Hirji Muiji v. Cheong Yue Steamship Co.,
1926 App. Cas. 497, 510 (P.C.)). Lord Wright's statement reiterated earlier published views.
"This whole doctrine of frustration has been described as a reading into the contract of implied
terms to give effect to the intention of the parties. It would be truer to say that the Court in the
absence of express intention of the parties determines what is just." LORD WRIGHT OF
DURLEY, LEGAL ESSAYS AND ADDRESSES 258 (1939).
131. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, 499 F. Supp. 53 (W.D. Pa. 1980). The indis-
pensable commentary on Alcoa appears in John P. Dawson, Judicial Revision of Frustrated
Contracts: The United States, 64 B.U. L. REv. 1 (1984).
132. "Beginning in 1973, OPEC actions to increase oil prices and unanticipated pollution
control costs greatly increased ALCOA's electricity costs .... As a result, ALCOA's produc-
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eral mistake of fact, unconscionability, frustration of purpose, and com-
mercial impracticability." 133
In view of the careful attention of the parties in Alcoa to the negotia-
tion of a price-indexing term, the claim that the risk of the resulting price
disparity was not contractually allocated is difficult to swallow. The
court nevertheless so held, finding that Alcoa was "entitled to some form
of relief" on the grounds of mutual mistake, impracticability, and frus-
tration of purpose. 134 On the facts of the case, a finding of excuse on any
of these grounds (let alone all three) makes the decision a notable one;
but its real interest lies in the remedy ordered by the court.
The usual remedy for mistake or frustration--discharge from the
obligation of future performance-was something Alcoa could scarcely
ask for. Alcoa's claim for relief depended on the assertion that the con-
tract as written imposed on it an inequitable burden. Yet performance of
the contract to the date of trial, over a period of eleven years, had left
Alcoa a substantial net profit. 135 What Alcoa hoped for was not to dis-
charge the contract, but to make future performance less burdensome.
Failing to obtain the other party's agreement to an amendment, Alcoa
asked the court for an "equitable modification." 13 6 The court obliged,
replacing the price term with a cost-plus formula of its own.
137
On the assumption that the contract was in fact frustrated by Al-
coa's increased costs, the relief granted-while innovative138 -can be jus-
tified in terms of the principles advocated by Lord Wright in Fibrosa. If
the remedy for frustration is truly to be determined by the court "on the
basis of what is fair and reasonable, not what as individuals [the parties]
would or might have agreed," 139 it is not obvious why that remedy
should be limited to discharge, or discharge plus restitution, or even dis-
charge plus restitution plus recovery for reliance expenditures. The re-
tion costs rose greatly and unforeseeably beyond the indexed increase in the contract price."
Alcoa, 499 F. Supp. at 58.
133. Id. at 57. The original term of the contract was fifteen years; Essex had an option to
extend for a further five years. The court found that "without judicial relief or economic
changes which are not presently foreseeable," Alcoa stood to lose "in excess of $75,000,000 out
of pocket" over the ten remaining years of the extended contract term. Id at 57-59.
134. Id at 70.
135. See id. at 59 (Table I).
136. Id at 57.
137. See id at 78-80.
138. To justify the remedy in Alcoa, as did the court, as an instance of contractual "refor-
mation" for mutual mistake is to rewrite the law of the subject. "Reformation is not a proper
remedy for the enforcement of terms to which the defendant never assented; it is a remedy the
purpose of which is to make a mistaken writing conform to antecedent expressions on which
the parties agreed." 3 CORBIN, supra note 1, § 614.
139. Supra note 130.
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suit in Alcoa is only remotely a function of the parties' own agreement;
but if the court can really write a better contract with the benefit of hind-
sight, we must decide whether there are persuasive reasons why it should
refrain from doing so.
The traditional objection, the "hoary maxim" that courts will not
make a contract for the parties, was dismissed in Alcoa as one of the
"half-remembered truths and remembered half-truths from the venerated
first-year course in Contract Law."'14 The author of the opinion, Judge
Teitelbaum, insisted that courts can and do make contracts for the par-
ties, and on a proper occasion should do so:
[W]hile the Court willingly concedes that the managements of AL-
COA and Essex are better able to conduct their business than is the
Court, in this dispute the Court has information from hindsight far
superior to that which the parties had when they made their contract.
The parties may both be better served by an informed judicial decision
based on the known circumstances than by a decision wrenched from
words of the contract which were not chosen with a prevision of to-
day's circumstances.141
The comparative advantage of hindsight over foresight makes an ex-
tremely powerful claim. By traditional standards it proves too much,
since there are few contracts that could not be improved by the courts if
"fairness" (with the benefit of hindsight) is accepted as the measure. Yet
the fundamental impulse behind the Alcoa decision-the reluctance to
entrust serious economic consequences to the parties' imperfect ordering
of their future relations-is recognizably the basis of more sophisticated
modem arguments for judicial intervention. It is to these arguments that
we now turn.
III. The Trouble With "Gap-Filling"
It might reasonably be asked why the law of contracts allows dis-
charge for mistake or frustration in the first place. The doctrine is best
explained as a judicial refusal to enforce contracts beyond their original
limits.' 42 Common sense sets limits to a promise, even where contractual
language does not. Though a promise is expressed in unqualified terms, a
person does not normally mean to bind himself to do the impossible, or
to persevere when performance proves to be materially different from
140. Alcoa, 499 F. Supp. at 91.
141. Id.
142. The more traditional view, stemming from Taylor v. Caldwell, would treat the availa-
bility of discharge for mistake or frustration as an implied term of the contract. For examples
of this theme see the discussion supra note 62 and text accompanying notes 57-62, 101. Once
the availability of relief has been judicially announced, it may alternatively be regarded as a
common-law "default rule" with reference to which the parties are deemed to contract.
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what both parties anticipated at the time of formation. Faced with the
adverse consequences of such a disparity, even a person who has previ-
ously regarded his promise as unconditional is likely to protest that he
never promised to do that. Judges at one time gave this instinctive plead-
ing a Virgilian paraphrase: non haec in foedera ven. 143 The force of the
implicit claim is hard to deny: I did not mean my promise to extend to
this circumstance; nor did you so understand it; to give it that effect
would therefore be to enforce a contract different from the one we actu-
ally made. 144
There is an obvious and critical difference between the plea non haec
in foedera veni-denying one's obligation to perform under the circum-
stances prevailing-and the claim that the risk of the disparity in ques-
tion was allocated by contract to the other party. The former entitles a
party not to proceed; it takes the latter, however, to found a claim in
restitution based on one's performance or part performance of a mistaken
or frustrated contract. But the mistaken or frustrated contract results, ex
hypothesi, from a risk the parties failed to allocate; to assign that risk to
either party by legal process would amount to enforcing a contract differ-
ent from the one that was actually made. If a court is unwilling to do
this, it must let the loss from the unallocated risk lie where it falls. In
this view, Walker did not agree to deliver Rose 2d if she turned out to be
with calf; therefore the law will not compel him to do so. But neither did
Boynton agree to make restitution of the topaz if it proved to be a dia-
mond, since the risk of mistake on this point was not allocated to the
buyer; nor did Fairbairn agree to refund Fibrosa's initial payment if war
should make it impossible to deliver flax-hackling machines. A decision
denying restitution in the latter two cases could therefore be adequately
explained by a rule forbidding courts to make contracts for the parties.
143. Aeneas, who has just announced that he is leaving her, protests to the outraged Dido:
"nec coniugis umquam /praetendi taedas, aut haec infoedera veni ' ("but I never said anything
about marriage"). VIRGIL, AENEID iv. 337-39. The phrase appears in judicial opinions to give
point to the idea that one is not bound by a promise substantially different from one he has in
fact made. "[A]ny variation in the agreement to which the surety has subscribed ... will
discharge the surety, upon the principle of the maxim non haec in foedera venL" Smith v.
United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 219, 237 (1865). On the judicial use of this tag see Max Radin,
ergilius Iurisconsultus, 15 CLASSICAL J. 304 (1920).
144. Recent economic analysis questions whether any rule allowing discharge of contrac-
tual obligations for mistake or frustration (as opposed to an unqualified rule of damages for
nonperformance) is consistent with efficient risk-bearing by contracting parties. See Sykes,
supra note 11, at 93; White, supra note 11, at 374-76. Assuming the validity of the economic
demonstration, however, the argument then is that efficient transactions should be compelled
whether or not they are, by traditional standards, the voluntary undertakings of the parties. A
requirement of efficient outcomes independent of individual volition might as easily compel
efficient transactions between strangers.
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Losses or windfall gains will lie where they fall for the simple reason that
the parties have not agreed upon an appropriate loss-shifting mechanism
and the court has no standards by which to choose one. 145
The windfall result might thus be justified as one consequence,
among others, of an absolute requirement that judges cease judging when
they reach the boundaries of the parties' agreement-although that
agreement will inevitably be incomplete in some respects, more or less
significant. There is a substantial theoretical argument to be made in
support of such a requirement, rooted in the individualistic tradition that
sees the distinctive quality of contractual obligation in the fact that it is
self-imposed. Judges do not write contracts for the parties, in this view,
not from hoary superstition but because to do so results in the enforce-
ment, presumptively illegitimate, of a nonconsensual exchange.
Modem contract law perceives so many countervailing considera-
tions to the individualistic tradition that the freely negotiated, self-im-
posed obligation has become a genuine rarity. If the windfall principle
depended for its vitality on this absolute conception of freedom of con-
tract it would be of little practical significance. Yet the windfall principle
still decides cases; and its insights are highly pertinent to the choice of
optimal legal rules for the problems of mistake and frustration. The
modem question it poses is whether, in the context of mistake and frus-
tration, judicial intervention to reform or supplement privately negoti-
ated terms has the same justification that it may be conceded to have in
the context of other contract disputes. A number of considerations sug-
gest that it does not.
145. The objection is sometimes made that a rule disfavoring judicial intervention cannot
serve as a principled basis for resolving these issues because a decision to let the loss lie is itself
an intervention. Thus Professor Fried has written that
it is just the point that on the issues in question [the unallocated risks] the parties had
no will at all, so that any resolution of the problem is necessarily imposed by the
court. In short there has just been an accident, and any resolution of the accident is a
kind of judgment, a kind of intervention.
FRIED, supra note 4, at 65. A court asked to hear a lawsuit must issue some sort of order, but
there is a manifest difference between an order directing the parties to shift losses and an order
declining to do so. The latter is not "intervention," at least in the usual sense, because it leaves
undisturbed a distribution of gains and losses produced by chance and by relevant provisions
of the parties' agreement, such as the payment terms. The windfall distribution of frustration
losses is not something as to which the parties "had no will at all"; it is a function of their
agreement and (under a windfall regime) will be the object of more or less conscious bargain-
ing. See the further discussion infra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.
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A. The Questionable Significance of the Outcome
By comparison with most disputed issues of contract law, the direct
social interest in the outcome of cases of mistake and frustration is rela-
tively slight. The primary justification for devoting public resources to
the resolution of contract disputes must be the great social utility derived
from the enforcement of enforceable promises; yet here the problem
arises precisely because no pertinent promise has been made.
The discovery that a cow thought to be barren is with calf, or that a
supposed topaz is a diamond, is a clear gain to society; but whether the
property acquires its greater value in the hands of one person or another
will normally be a matter of complete social indifference. Neither buyer
nor seller has an inherently superior claim to the added value, and the
very fact that the entitlement is contested is itself a matter of the purest
chance. 14" There is an obvious social interest in enforcing the parties'
own allocation of the benefit, awarding the fertile cow or the diamond to
the party who had bargained for the chance of it; but that allocation, ex
hypothesi, has not been made. Any step to shift these "windfall" gains
from one party to another-sending the sheriff to fetch the cow or to
reclaim the diamond-would therefore involve dead-weight social costs
that judges rightly choose not to incur.
The incentive to intervene seems stronger if the windfall is a nega-
tive quantity, though why this should be so is not entirely clear. That
one party to a contract should suffer the whole of a casualty loss is more
likely to seem harsh or unfair than that he should enjoy the whole of a
windfall gain. Even so, the common law has traditionally viewed the
shifting or sharing of losses, in the absence of extrinsic liability, as both
unproductive and unjustifiable.1 47 The law has no rules that permit it to
order loss-sharing for its own sake, and no standards that would enable it
to do so justly.
146. Had the new information in either case been available earlier, the disputed bargains
would not have been made; were it discovered significantly later, no attempt would be made to
avoid either transaction. When an item of property suddenly increases in value, our normal
expectation is that the benefit accrues to its owner; when value decreases, the identical (con-
verse) rule is that res perit domino. Thus a sudden change in value-windfall or casualty-
gives rise to a dispute only when it occurs in awkward proximity to a transfer of ownership. It
is a precondition of cases like Wood and Sherwood that new information affecting value be-
come available between the time of contracting and the time of delivery or, at the latest,
promptly after delivery. In the same way, cases of frustration typically arise when new infor-
mation as to the cost or value of performance becomes available after contract formation but
before performance has begun, or else during the course of performance.
147. "In general it is not plain that a man's misfortunes or necessities will justify his shift-
ing the damages to his neighbor's shoulders." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
416 (1922) (Holmes, J.).
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Intuitive standards of "fairness" may suggest that a loss be borne by
the rich rather than the poor; by the many rather than the few; by both
parties to the contract rather than one alone. Such answers have little
appeal to most economists, since the same considerations might justify a
much broader program of wealth redistribution. The law and economics
case for judicial intervention to adjust frustrated contracts has focused
instead on what is at best a secondary objective of contract law: the
choice of legal rules that will induce efficient risk spreading by con-
tracting parties. Yet the remedy commonly proposed seems incapable of
furthering even this relatively modest goal.
B. The Peculiar Intractability of Mistake and Frustration
Arguments in favor of judicial intervention to reform or supplement
privately negotiated agreements rest on a number of assertions that are
more or less plausible in the context of other issues of contractual inter-
pretation. They fail, or they are at least distinctly less persuasive, when
applied to the problem of mistake and frustration. In particular, it is
highly unsatisfactory to analyze judicial remedies for mistake and frus-
tration as an instance of the gap-filling function of contract law and inter-
pretation without acknowledging the distinctive quality of these gaps.
To the extent that mistake and frustration result from contractual gaps,
the way the gaps are formed makes them peculiarly difficult to fill. The
usual prescription, which is that courts supply the term the parties would
have chosen for themselves were there no transaction costs, is unavailing
in this context. Even if the forgone private choice could be identified
with confidence, which it cannot, the effect of private choice in this con-
text-the allocation of a risk of disparity--can no longer be achieved ex-
post, when the risk has already materialized into an economic loss. The
law and economics recommendation, that courts reconstruct hypotheti-
cal risk allocations by identifying superior risk bearers, affords circum-
stantial evidence as to the parties' intent but not a remedy for frustrated
contracts.
The contrast between the windfall rule of Chandler v. Webster and a
rule of judicial intervention to shift losses from frustrated contracts af-
fords a particularly clear illustration of the basic choice to be made in
selecting rules by which to interpret contracts. One alternative favors
bright-line rules of maximum predictability, which the parties may either
contract around or adopt for their own purposes. The other alternative
sacrifices the certainty of expectations that facilitates private ordering in
favor of ad hoc intervention to serve social goals: in the present context
these are likely to be identified as either "fairness" or "efficiency." The
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choice between private and judicial allocation of losses is very sharply
drawn in this context, because the availability of judicial intervention ac-
tually destroys the mechanism that makes the private allocation possible.
A rule that losses will lie where they fall enables contracting parties to
make their own allocation, not only of the risks of potential disparities
(thereby avoiding frustration), but of the losses to be incurred should
their contract be frustrated by the realization of a risk they neglect (or
choose not) to allocate. This private allocation of frustration losses,
which is displaced by a rule permitting judicial intervention, is examined
more closely in the succeeding section. 148
A common presumption sees a contract as "incomplete" if it fails to
address specifically any ground of subsequent dispute. All contracts are
potentially "incomplete" in this sense, a circumstance that may be ex-
plained in terms of transaction costs149 or simple human fallibility. The
most common defense of judicial intervention asserts that a court-sup-
plied clause, properly chosen, can rectify an omission by providing the
term the parties would have negotiated if they had thought about it. 150
So conceived, the judicial role comes very close to enforcing the parties'
own agreement rather than writing one for them. The only problem is
whether the question of what the parties "would have done" can be relia-
bly answered.
The idea that incomplete contracts result from transaction costs
leads to a related conception, that the court's role in dealing with gaps is
to design suitable default rules (in the manner of U.C.C. provisions), to
govern both the case at bar and future contracts unless varied by express
agreement. The standard approach to the choice of default rules recom-
mends that they be those the parties to a typical contract would be most
likely to select for themselves. This view looks to the economies to be
realized by contracting parties, who will negotiate fewer tailor-made pro-
visions when they may, if they choose, incorporate off-the-rack terms by
148. See infra Part III.C.
149. See Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Contract
Remedies, 57 U. COLO. L. REv. 683, 691-92 (1986) ("If negotiation were costless, the parties
would draft complete contracts that defined the terms of performance under every possible
contingency.").
150. "The task for a court asked to apply a contract to a contingency that the parties did
not foresee is to imagine how the parties would have provided for the contingency if it had
occurred to them to do so." RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.1, at 82
(3d ed. 1986). "Ambiguities and gaps in contracts should be resolved by finding what the
parties would have bargained for had they addressed the matter explicitly at the time." Na-
tional Distillers & Chem. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 804 F.2d 978, 982 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easter-
brook, J.).
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saying nothing at all. 151 But this standard prescription for judicial inter-
vention confronts distinctive difficulties when used to fill the most visible
and interesting sort of contractual gaps, those that result in mistaken and
frustrated contracts.
The suggestion that a court fill a gap in a contract by supplying the
term the parties would have chosen themselves is feasible only if the un-
answered question is one that most parties similarly situated would an-
swer the same way most of the time. If the parties have not specified a
time for performance, a court serves efficiency goals if, in the absence of
contrary indications, it supplies a term calling for performance within a
reasonable time. 152 Default terms actually employed by the courts rarely
depart from this comfortable level of generalization. But the common-
sense reasoning that permits a court to supplement a contract in this
manner is powerless to answer the question, incomparably more com-
plex, of how the parties would have allocated the risk of a particular
frustrating circumstance that they chose not to address in their
agreement. 153
151. Judge Posner asserts that a function of contract law generally is "to economize on
transaction costs by supplying standard contract terms that the parties would otherwise have
to adopt by express agreement." POSNER, supra note 150, § 14.3, at 372. See also Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261, 270 (1985) ("[A] key
purpose of state-supplied terms is to save parties from the necessity of formulating a complete
set of express conditions for contingencies that may be difficult to anticipate, or are at least
easily overlooked."); Kornhauser, supra note 149, at 692 ("[TIhe efficient gap-filling rule is that
rule which most closely corresponds to the term which the majority of bargainers would
choose for themselves.") Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92
YALE L.J. 763, 766 (1983) ("[Llegally-implied provisions establish a set of ready-made con-
tract terms, and whenever the parties would have included similar provisions in their agree-
ment, they are made better off by being spared the time and expense of having to do so."). In
the Alcoa decision, Judge Teitelbaum defended his readiness to furnish "an appropriate rem-
edy when a prudently drafted long term contract goes badly awry" by urging that parties
would otherwise "needlessly suffer the delay and expense of ever more detailed and sophisti-
cated drafting in an attempt to approximate by agreement what the law could readily furnish
by general rule." Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, 499 F. Supp. 53, 89 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
A sharply contrasting view of the proper choice of default rules sees them as the means to
influence bargaining behavior. The law might impose a "penalty" default rule-a contract
term likely to be unacceptable to one or both parties-to govern some incident of the contract
as to which specific negotiation was particularly desirable. See Ian Ayres & Robert V. Gert-
ner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87, 95-107 (1989).
152. See U.C.C. § 2-309 (1978). The rule was not of course, a statutory innovation. See,
e.g., Roberts v. Mazeppa Mill Co., 30 Minn. 413, 415-16, 15 N.W. 680, 681 (1883).
153. The available evidence suggests that the parties considered the costs of negotiating an
allocation of the risk in question to outweigh the benefits. See Clayton P. Gillette, Commercial
Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69 MINN. L. REv. 521, 536-37
(1985) ("[Clommercial actors may exclude a risk from their completed contract not because
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 43
CONTRACT REMEDIES
The seemingly insuperable difficulty of divining the parties' unex-
pressed ex-ante preferences might appear to be resolved if we could iden-
tify a universal principle by which all contracting parties, properly
informed, would choose to allocate those risks of mistake and frustration
not otherwise addressed by their agreement. Thus Posner and Rosenfield
proposed, in a well known article, that judges allocate the risk of a frus-
trating circumstance by assigning it to the party determined to be the
superior risk bearer.154 Because the superior risk bearer is the party who
can bear the risk in question at lower cost, allocation of the risk to him is
in the economic interest of both parties; it is therefore the informed
choice of all parties for all risks.
The relationship between superior risk bearing and risk allocation
provides an important insight, but commentators have not generally been
clear about its implications. Where the difference in the parties' risk-
bearing capacity is sufficiently pronounced, an identification of the supe-
rior risk bearer may enable us to reconstnct an allocation of risks that
was an implicit (i.e., actual and intended) part of their agreement. In-
deed, the idea that risk bearing will serve as a guide to the intent of the
parties appears to have been the principal claim of Posner and Rosen-
field. 155 If the owner of a building has insurance covering the value of
repairs or additions while work is in progress, and the builder's interest is
uninsurable, a court might reasonably conclude that the risk of destruc-
tion prior to completion was implicitly allocated to the owner even if his
contract with the builder says nothing about it. But the status of eco-
nomic analysis in this example is merely that of any other circumstantial
evidence as to the parties' intent; and if we can properly identify a con-
tractual allocation of the risk, by inquiring into risk-bearing capacity or
any other evidence, the contract is not frustrated.
the risk was beyond their contemplation but because they considered it and decided that inclu-
sion was not worth the commensurate cost.").
154. The "superior (more efficient) risk bearer" is either the party "in a better position to
prevent the risk from materializing" or else the lower-cost insurer. Posner & Rosenfield, supra
note 3, at 90-91.
155. The authors' initial premise is that "the purpose of contract law is to effectuate the
desires of the contracting parties"; in this undertaking "[t]he inquiry [into superior risk bear-
ing] is merely an aid to interpretation." Id. at 89-90. Compare the more recent statement by
Judge Posner that "impossibility and related doctrines are devices for shifting risk in accord-
ance with the parties' presumed intentions." Northern Ind. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Carbon County
Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 278 (7th Cir. 1986). In the earlier article, however, the authors draw
no apparent distinction between an allocation of risks that is implicit in the parties' agreement
and an allocation the parties would have made, had they made one. The distinction is critical,
because it marks the difference between a contract that is frustrated and a contract that may be
enforced according to its terms.
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The assertion that risk-bearing capacity should influence the choice
of remedies for frustrated contracts necessarily implies, therefore, that a
judicial allocation to the superior risk bearer can substitute for a contrac-
tual allocation the parties did not make for themselves. This contention
overlooks the simple but critical fact that the contract comes before the
court only after the risk of the allegedly frustrating disparity has materi-
alized. The parties' neglected opportunity to make an ex-ante allocation
of risks has been irretrievably lost. Instead, a court confronted with an
allegedly frustrated contract (which it may enforce or discharge on
whatever terms it chooses) is necessarily limited to an ex-post allocation
of losses. Superior risk-bearing capacity does not indicate superior loss-
bearing capacity, which by one standard economic premise cannot be
determined at all. 156 The very different suggestion that frustration losses
be judicially assigned on the explicit basis of loss-bearing capacity draws
its assumptions less from microeconomics than from considerations of
fairness. 157
The judicial assignment of frustration losses to superior risk bearers
might nevertheless be thought desirable for its influence on future trans-
actions. Because parties in a costless negotiation would assign every risk
to the superior risk bearer, a default rule to this effect might appear to
permit savings on transaction costs while encouraging the efficient alloca-
tion of risks. But compared to the alternatives-one possibility being the
rule that the loss lies where it falls-a default rule based on an after-the-
fact judicial assessment of risk-bearing capacity is singularly unappeal-
ing. Its effect would be to cause parties to assign every risk of a frustrat-
ing event, not otherwise allocated by their contract, to that party
determined by a court (after the frustration of the contract) to have been
the superior risk bearer with respect to that risk. This is an off-the-rack
term that no rational contracting party would willingly adopt, given the
near impossibility of predicting which party would later be found by the
156. The assumption that each person's marginal utility of wealth decreases with greater
wealth does not permit us to compare the marginal utilities of different people, whatever their
respective wealth at the time of comparison. See Alan Schwartz, Sales Law and Inflations, 50
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 6-8 (1976) (judicial process unsuited to draw "comparisons respecting
relative satisfaction"). The absence of economic criteria for loss-sharing has led a number of
commentators to advocate simply that frustration losses be allocated to the parties pro rata.
See DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 4.5, at 268-69 & n. 24 (1973); TREBILCOCK, supra note 4.
157. See Roscoe POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 162-63 (2d ed.
1954) (contrasting the traditional "[b]elief in the obligatory force of contracts and respect for
the given word" with "an idea we may see at work in the law of legal liability everywhere ....
a humanitarian idea of lifting or shifting burdens and losses so as to put them upon those better
able to bear them").
[Vol. 43
court to have been the superior risk bearer with respect to the risk in
question.
Risk-bearing capacity is ordinarily understood to include, not
merely the parties' relative aversion to risk (in itself a condition that real-
world courts can scarcely ascertain), but also their relative capacity to
avoid a given risk or to insure against it, by self-insurance or otherwise.
These are conditions that depend on the nature of the risk in question, so
that the superior risk bearer with respect to a given risk frequently can-
not be identified, even theoretically, until the nature of the risk is known.
But the function of a default term in this context is to allocate unidenti-
fied risks, many of them "unforeseeable" in common parlance. More-
over, even if the nature of certain classes of unidentified risks could be
accurately identified in advance, the determination of superior risk-bear-
ing capacity depends on so many additional variables, many of them diffi-
cult to establish conclusively, that it will normally be impossible for
contracting parties to predict with confidence how a future court might
decide the issue.15 8 Superior risk-bearing capacity as determined after
the fact by judges is therefore a default term that conveys no usable infor-
mation to the parties; and an uninformative default term cannot be the
source of any economies from superior risk spreading.
The imposition of a default term whose effect is uncertain will not
reduce transaction costs. On the contrary, it will increase them: parties
will attempt to exclude by contract the added uncertainty of unpredict-
able judicial intervention. Where they fail to do so, the uncertainty of
outcomes under any such legal rule will encourage litigation.15 9 Nor can
a default term yielding unpredictable results produce more efficient risk
spreading, since increased efficiencies can only be realized when each
party knows which risks he will bear. But it is precisely where a risk-
bearing advantage is clear enough to be recognized that the parties are
most likely to allocate it as an express or implied term of the contract.
Such risks will therefore not be assigned by the default rule, whatever it
may be. While the sheer in terrorem effect of an unpredictable default
rule would presumably encourage a greater investment by the parties in
158. The essential unpredictability of this determination, even when made by experts, may
be observed in the seemingly arbitrary identification of superior risk bearers by Posner and
Rosenfield in their discussion of case-law examples. See Posner & Rosenfield, supra note 3, at
100-08.
159. See Sykes, supra note 11, at 72-73 (consequences of "vague and unpredictable rules"
for the contracting process include "incompatible expectations about the outcome of dispute
resolution").
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contractual negotiation and specific risk allocation, this result is not a
distinctive advantage of the rule under consideration. 160
The same difficulty attends the attempt to construct a default rule
allocating the risk of frustration on any other theory of what most parties
might otherwise choose to negotiate for themselves. Empirical or "socio-
logical" data 161 will not support any explanation of how parties would
normally prefer to assign a class of risks that by definition they do not
think it worthwhile to assign to either party. Standards for choosing a
default rule that might, at least in theory, be superimposed on the parties'
lack of awareness-such as efficiency or fairness, if we could agree on
what they required-are incapable of replicating the results of even an
idealized ex-ante choice, because the fact of allocation induces changes in
ex-ante behavior that cannot be recaptured ex-post. The party who
"would have" been allocated the risk of the frustrating event would also
have tried to avoid it, or would have purchased insurance against it; and
these irretrievable possibilities bring down the hypothetical house of
cards. The root of the difficulty is the logical impossibility of accommo-
dating ex-post information without altering the ex-ante world, reminis-
cent of the problem facing back-to-the-future time-travelers who find
themselves powerless to intervene in those events that history has
noticed.
It is thus possible to formulate a default rule for the unallocated risk
of disparity only if we vary the usual assumption about the function of
default rules, which is that they imitate and supplement the private, ex-
ante definition of contractual rights and duties. Conceivably, the default
rule most parties might prefer (or the rule that society should impose) is
one reading as follows: "In the event of the frustration of this agreement,
any resulting gains or losses not specifically allocated herein shall be ap-
portioned by a court of competent jurisdiction on such terms as justice
may require." This is, in effect, the default rule recommended by the
160. Compare Professor Birmingham's suggestion, "Shoot a contracting party who does
not foresee a supervening event." Robert L. Birmingham, Why is There Taylor v. Caldwell?
Three Propositions About Impracticability, 23 U.S.F. L. REv. 379, 387 (1989). Besides being
administratively costly, such a rule would presumably induce supra-optimal investment in
"precontractual investigation." See generally Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investigation
as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1988).
161. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising,
88 MICH. L. REv. 489, 505-08 (1989) (discussing the possibility of "a sociological inquiry into
the actual practices and customs" of contracting parties as a possible source of legitimate
"background rules").
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Restatement, 162 defended by distinguished commentators, 163 and applied
in a case like Alcoa. 164
The propriety or desirability of such a rule can only be determined
by comparing its benefits in terms of superior loss-sharing (however these
might be defined) to its costs under different headings: the cost to indi-
vidual freedom of substituting "balancing" for "rule-oriented" methods
of resolving disputes;165 and the inefficient inducement to contracting
parties to externalize transaction costs that would otherwise be for their
own account.' 66 What is clear, at least, is that such a default rule cannot
be justified by the usual efficiency-based analogy to U.C.C. provisions
and standard-form contracts. Rather than facilitating the private alloca-
tion of risks, it invites contracting parties to opt for a judicial allocation
of losses. As we have seen, the latter is no substitute for the former.
C. The Displaced Private Allocation
A legal regime that leaves losses from frustration to lie where they
fall-as was clearly understood to be the case in England, from Appleby
v. Meyers to Fibrosa-is one under which the parties to any contract allo-
cate two levels of risks. To the extent they think it worthwhile, the par-
ties allocate the risks of various frustrating circumstances, either
162. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 272 (1979).
163. See, eg., FRIED, supra note 4, at 69-73.
164. Discussed supra at 36-38.
165. See generally Rizzo, supra note 18. In a recent article, Professor Craswell canvasses
the possibility that the choice of "background rules" be made "in favor of the rule that best
serves some substantive moral value," such as the value of "individual liberty or autonomy"
frequently associated with philosophical justifications of the institution of contract itself. Cras-
well, supra note 161, at 511, 514-16. He suggests that "autonomy-based theories," which natu-
rally insist that parties be left free to set rules for themselves, are of little help "where the
parties have not specified the rule they prefer," since "any default rule would... be consistent
with individual freedom, as long as the parties are allowed to change the rule by appropriate
language." Id at 515. The observation is made in the context of default rules that supply a
substantive term. If the default rule operates instead to relieve the parties of responsibility for
determining a given incident of their relationship, substituting judicial intervention as a pre-
ferred solution, the infringement of individualistic values seems clear.
166. The allocation of risks is a cost of contracting, whether measured in negotiating ex-
penses or judicial resources. Ordinary economic considerations clearly dictate that this cost be
borne by the parties unless the courts enjoy some very significant comparative advantage in
performing the task. By requiring the parties to allocate unforeseeable risks for themselves, we
cause the decision about the level of resources to be invested in risk allocation to be decided by
those persons who have the best information on the subject and who, because they themselves
will make the investment, are directly interested in finding the efficient answer to the question.
By contrast, a system that permits contracting parties to leave the consequences of frustration
to be fixed by the courts encourages them to pass on to society generally what would otherwise
be a cost of doing business. If ex-ante and ex-post risk allocation were really equivalent, there
would be no justification for allowing the parties to leave the task to the courts.
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specifically or through such broad-brush devices as force majeure
clauses. Those specific risks that the parties either do not recognize or do
not choose to allocate comprise the residual risk that the contract will
eventually be frustrated for one reason or another. The risk of frustra-
tion, in this sense, is a risk the parties bear jointly. By contrast, the inci-
dence of the loss that may be attendant upon frustration is the subject of a
second allocation. Against the background of a default rule that the loss
from frustration will be left to lie where it falls, familiar techniques en-
able the parties to shift or share the incidence of such losses as simply or
as elaborately as they choose. If this legal rule is replaced by one under
which courts determine the consequences of frustration, the result is not
to fill gaps in the contract, but to create them.
The ex-ante allocation of losses from frustration operates chiefly by
adjusting the advantage or disadvantage to either party from an unex-
pected interruption of contractual performance. The basic mechanism
for shifting such losses, employed to some extent in most contracts, is
simply the payment term: payment in advance versus payment on deliv-
ery, with the intermediate possibilities of instalment payments, progress
payments, and the like, all of which may be made subject to such further
conditions as the parties choose.1 67 Expressed more generally, the inci-
dence of losses from frustration will be a function of the timing and con-
ditions of each party's obligations to perform. On the facts of Fibrosa,
for example, the loss caused by the frustrating event that later discharged
the contract had been clearly allocated between the parties as a function
of the payment terms. 168 Frustration loss early in the course of perform-
ance was assigned entirely to the buyer; frustration loss just before com-
pletion was assigned preponderantly to the seller. The allocation was
somewhat crude, but that is presumably because the parties saw no ad-
vantage in negotiating a more complex one. 169 The contractual devices
167. Posner and Rosenfield note that contractual payment terms serve many purposes
"unrelated to the provision of insurance against an event that may prevent completion of per-
formance"; they conclude from this that "there can be no presumption that prepayment is
intended to compensate the performing party for the risk of such an event." Posner & Rosen-
field, supra note 3, at 116. But the bargaining over a payment term (or any other term of a
contract) necessarily comprehends all aspects of the parties' relationship that the term is per-
ceived to affect. To the extent that a contracting party recognizes any possibility of receiving
less than the full performance promised to him (the risk of default by the other party will
normally loom larger than the risk of frustration), one of several motives in seeking the prom-
ised performance sooner rather than later will inevitably be to protect himself against an inter-
ruption of performance before completion.
168. Buyer was to pay one-third with the order and the balance against shipping docu-
ments. See Fibrosa S.A. v. Fairbairn Lawson Combe Barbour, Ltd., 1943 App. Cas. 32, 34
(1942).
169. The allocation might easily have been cruder still, assigning the whole risk of frustra-
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for allocating such losses are intuitively understood and limited only by
the energies of draftsmen. They can and will be refined as far as the
parties deem appropriate. 170
The residual allocation of frustration losses produced by these de-
vices in the context of a windfall rule is neither artificial nor arbitrary. It
is a result chosen by the parties, not in the tautological sense that it is
demonstrably a fimction of a privately chosen term but in a broader sense
that allows us to describe its consequences as consciously self-imposed.
In real-world negotiation, the possibility of frustration may be remote
from the minds of the parties, but the risk of interrupted performance
(presumably from the other party's default) is ever present. The parties
are also well aware that the courts provide no effective relief for most
contractual defaults. A's realistic expectation is therefore that, in the
event B ceases to perform and the parties are unable to negotiate a settle-
ment, A's best recourse will frequently be to walk away from the deal
without seeking or obtaining judicial intervention. Should such an event
come to pass, the circumstances of the parties will be precisely the same
as if their contract had been interrupted by frustration under a legal re-
gime denying judicial intervention. In everyday negotiation, therefore,
each party seeks to shift the incidence of the same kinds of losses as those
resulting from a frustrated contract, using devices designed to safeguard
against the consequences of default. The greater the possibility of B's
ceasing to perform, the more strongly A will bargain to receive B's per-
formance before his own is due. The contractual allocation of potential
frustration losses is not only theoretically possible, it is effectively being
made all the time. 171
tion to the buyer (by a requirement of full payment in advance) or to the seller (by providing
for payment only upon delivery). The converse mechanisms for a more refined allocation of
risk are equally obvious as a matter of draftsmanship. They include a progressively more
elaborate payment schedule, the multiplication of conditions, and provisions specifying the
terms of restitution for part performance and recovery for reliance in the event of frustration.
170. A variety of "ex ante allocational devices" suggested by Professor Gillette might be
available to supplement the performance-based devices considered in the text. See Gillette,
supra note 153, at 559-67.
171. Compare Professor Goldberg's observations on the significance of payment terms:
Prepayment should not be viewed as mere happenstance.... Contracting parties
might find any particular contingency too remote to worry about. Nonetheless, a
sensible rule for them to adopt is that there are a large number of reasons why a
particular contract might not be completed and one way to protect one's interests is
to assure that at each point in time, the performance rendered and compensation
received are not too far out of whack. By ordering restitution or attempting an in-
dependent assessment of reliance losses, courts undo the balancing of interests
achieved by the parties.
Goldberg, supra note 10, at 113-14 (footnote omitted).
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The possibility of a comprehensive ex-ante allocation of frustration
risks-one that includes both the risk of various frustrating circum-
stances and the incidence of loss should the contract nevertheless be frus-
trated-depends on the courts' refusal to shift those losses when they
occur. Conversely, it is only by holding out the promise of judicial inter-
vention to adjust losses ex aequo et bono that courts relieve the parties of
the need to address the distribution of these losses in the context of their
agreement. A rule that losses lie where they fall actually compels the
parties to allocate such losses ex-ante, including losses from risks de-
scribed as "unforeseeable"; while a rule permitting judicial intervention
and loss sharing makes it impossible for them to do so.
Discussing the problem of mistake and frustration-which he sees
as requiring an exception to an autonomy-based theory of contractual
obligation-Professor Fried writes that "[tihe court cannot enforce the
will of the parties because there are no concordant wills. Judgment must
therefore be based on principles external to the will of the parties." 17 2
But if we deny judicial intervention to adjust the consequences of frustra-
tion, Fried's conclusion does not follow. When it is perceived that the
incidence of frustration losses is a function of something so central to the
bargain, and so consciously negotiated, as the timing and conditions of
each party's obligations to perform, and that the parties have limitless
freedom to adjust and qualify that incidence as they see fit, it can hardly
be maintained that any adjustment of frustration losses is necessarily
based on "principles external to the will of the parties." Because the
insistence on private, ex-ante allocation provides what is at least a coher-
ent alternative, the argument for judicial intervention to adjust these
losses must stand on its own merits.
When a court formulates a restitutionary or loss-sharing remedy for
a frustrated contract, the suggestion that it is enforcing the contract the
parties would have made is no more than a polite fiction. The recon-
struction of an ex-ante allocation of risks is an impossible task, and the
true answer to that hypothetical question is not what the court is looking
for anyway. 173 The distribution of losses that the court finds undesirable,
thereby justifying its decision to intervene, is frequently the direct result
of the contract the parties did in fact make. Thus the frustration loss in
172. FRIED, supra note 4, at 60.
173. Parties who negotiate the allocation of remote risks do not always agree to share
them equitably. Accurate disposition of these losses on the basis of clauses that parties "would
have written" might therefore impose crippling losses on parties who "would have" agreed to
bear what they judged (correctly or otherwise) to be trivial risks in exchange for some more
immediate advantage in negotiation.
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Fibrosa was assigned entirely to the buyer (assuming the seller was made
whole by the retention of the initial payment) by terms of the contract
that, though implied, were clear and unequivocal. The anticipated loss in
Alcoa looks very much as if it was assigned to the plaintiff by an elabo-
rately negotiated pricing clause-a clause that contained no protection
against the resulting disparity because the plaintiff considered that risk
too remote to warrant drafting against. 174 The problem in either case is
not that a loss was not allocated by the parties but that the results of that
allocation proved unacceptable in the view of the court.
The judicial allocation of frustration losses ex-post does not derive
from contractual obligation, but rather supplants it. The loss is adjusted,
not (as in contract) as a function of the parties' self-interested calcula-
tions and luck, but according to external standards that may include sim-
ple fairness, or a "principle of sharing," 175 or the avoidance of
injustice, 176 or other Concerns more frankly paternalistic:
Corporate managers are fiduciaries. Law, founded on good sense,
requires them to act with care in the management of businesses owned
by other people.... Courts must consider the fiduciary duty of man-
agement and the established practice of risk limitation in interpreting
contracts and in the application of contract doctrines such as mistake,
frustration and impracticability. Corporate managers should not gam-
ble with corporate funds.... Courts should not presume that they do,
nor should they frame rules founded on such a presumption. 177
The idea here is that contracts are too important to be left to the
parties. 178
174. The complex price term in Alcoa was drafted by the plaintiff for its own protection:
ALCOA's management was equally attentive to risk limitation. They went so far as
to retain the noted economist Dr. Alan Greenspan as a consultant to advise them on
the drafting of an objective pricing formula. They selected the [index] as a pricing
element for this long term contract only after they assured themselves that it had
closely tracked ALCOA's non-labor production costs for many years in the past and
was highly likely to continue to do so in the future. In the context of the formation
of the contract, it is untenable to argue that ALCOA implicitly or expressly assumed
a limitless, if highly improbable, risk. On this record, the absence of an express floor
limitation can only be understood to imply that the parties deemed the risk too remote
and their meaning too clear to trifle with additional negotiation and drafting.
Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Group, 499 F. Supp. 53, 69 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (emphasis ad-
ded). By its very plausible reconstruction of the circumstances of the negotiation, the court
refutes its own contention that Alcoa could not have assumed a large (not limitless), "highly
improbable" risk. On the contrary, that is precisely what Alcoa appears to have done.
175. See FRIED, supra note 4, at 70-73.
176. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 272 cmt. c (1979).
177. Alcoa, 499 F. Supp. at 89-90.
178. For a more measured discussion of the argument for judicial adjustment of frustra-
tion losses to protect third parties, see Gillette, supra note 153, at 582-85.
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The argument for judicial intervention frequently regards the parties
to a frustrated contract as if they were joint victims of a contractual acci-
dent, with no more opportunity to adjust losses by prior agreement than
the parties to an automobile accident. 179 In the absence of any other
guiding principle, it follows that their losses should be adjusted in the
interests of fairness, loss splitting, and the public interest generally. The
windfall rule that would let such losses lie denies that any of these inter-
ests may be confidently served except by the enforcement of freely negoti-
ated bargains. The choice is ultimately a moral and political one,
between rules that require people to provide for themselves and rules that
permit judges to intervene when people do not provide for themselves
well enough. The old cases supporting the windfall principle rest on a
conception of individual autonomy and responsibility that at many
points does not square with modern assumptions. They serve to remind
us nevertheless that the powers of private ex-ante allocation may be
greater, and those of ex-post judicial allocation may be less, than is cur-
rently recognized even in the law and economics commentary on the
subject.
IV. Conclusion
The contract doctrines of "mutual mistake" and "frustration" (in-
cluding impossibility, commercial impracticability, and so forth) are at-
tempts to deal with a single problem: the inevitable disparity between
the terms of an exchange as contemplated by the parties at the moment
of contract formation and the terms of the same exchange as subse-
quently perceived in the light of additional information. The various
tests by which courts purport to grant or withhold rescission on these
grounds may be reduced to a single inquiry: whether the risk of the dis-
parity complained of was expressly or impliedly allocated by the
contract.
Once that determination has been made, the focus shifts to what has
been the concern of this Article: what it is that courts actually do when
they encounter what they take to be an unallocated disparity. A wide
range of cases, arising in the various contexts of mutual mistake and frus-
tration, suggests that the characteristic response of our courts is to con-
firm the parties in statu quo, granting relief to neither. Rescission for
mistake is thus granted or denied depending on whether the contract is
179. "Sharing applies where there are no rights to respect. It is the principle that would
apply if a group of us were to land together on some new planet. It is peculiarly appropriate to
filling the gaps in agreements, to picking up after contractual accidents." FRIED, supra note 4,
at 71 (footnote omitted).
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executory or executed. Applied to the problem of partial performance,
the windfall principle embodies the former English rule that losses from
frustrated contracts will lie where they fall. The English courts' adoption
and subsequent rejection of an explicit windfall rule to govern these
cases, seen in the light of more recent decisions, serves to identify the
outer limits of the windfall principle in modem law and, conversely, the
limits of present-day judicial forbearance.
Substantial case law supporting the old proposition that "the loss
lies where it falls" reminds us that losses from "contractual accidents"
may be effectively allocated by means other than judicial intervention. A
legal rule foreclosing intervention not only permits, it actually obliges the
parties to allocate the incidence of loss from frustration as a function of
their ex-ante negotiation. Conversely, the mere possibility of ex-post ju-
dicial intervention to reform or supplement their private agreement
makes it impossible for them to do so.
While the law and economics commentary has been notably sympa-
thetic to judicial intervention in this context, the usual efficiency-based
arguments do not withstand examination. No set of judicially imposed
default rules can usefully allocate unidentified risks; nor can judges do
anything to optimize risk spreading by their ex-post reallocation of
losses. Approaching the problem from a different perspective, those
commentators who set a high value on contractual fairness at least need
make no theoretical apology for supporting judicial intervention to pick
up and redistribute the pieces after a "contractual accident." But such a
procedure is extremely expensive, and the value of the additional fairness
is difficult to measure. One of the costs, in what must inevitably be a
very complex accounting, is the loss of another kind of fairness: the fair-
ness that exists whenever the outcome of a private transaction is exclu-
sively a function of the parties' voluntary agreement.
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